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Act of 1925 (FAA) emerged, at least in part, from a broader Progressive commitment to proce-
dural reform. It departs, however, from the tendency among procedure scholars to conceive of
such reform as top-down, federal rulemaking -a tendency that has resulted in a largely celebra-
tory teleology, leading from a Progressive commitment to access to justice to the eventual enact-
ment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. As recognized in the historical literature,
local, bottom-up initiatives (such as the creation of municipal courts and settlement houses)
were central to Progressive reform. Moreover, these initiatives were used at least as much for
purposes of social control as for social justice. In line with such literature, this Feature examines
Progressive lawyers' efforts to develop particular institutional structures responsible for deploy-
ing arbitration-an area of inquiry neglected by scholars to date. Situating these efforts within
the broader context of a decidedly paternalistic program of Progressive procedural reform, it re-
flects on the darker implications of the FAA's enactment and implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
Even as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has become increasingly
common over the last several decades, the debate over its perceived virtues and
vices has intensified. For just about every claim made on behalf of ADR, critics
have arisen to assert the contrary. While much of the debate has focused on the
extent to which ADR achieves the cost- and time-savings promised by its advo-
cates,1 the discussion has also addressed fundamental values extending well be-
yond efficiency. Advocates of ADR insist that it is more effective than adversar-
ial procedure at promoting values of party participation- and thus autonomy-
and at ensuring broad, meaningful access to justice.' In contrast, detractors
claim that ADR's promises of party autonomy and increased access are often
hollow in practice. In their view, ADR advances the interests of a select elite,
while denying countless ordinary individuals the remedies afforded by the pro-
verbial day in court.'
While the debate over ADR has ranged across a number of specific dispute
resolution practices, it is arbitration-and, in particular, binding, pre-dispute
arbitration- that has lately assumed center stage. In recent years, the United
States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions reinterpreting the Federal Ar-
bitration Act of 1925 (FAA), the net effect of which has been significantly to ex-
1. For the argument that ADR does not translate into savings in time and money, see, for ex-
ample, Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 813, 817, 834 (2000); and Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Our-
selves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, io8
PENN ST. L. REv. 165, 178-8o (2003). For some examples of the opposing view, see Todd B.
Carver, ADR-A Competitive Imperative for Business, 59 Disp. RESOL. J. 67, 70-72 (2004); and
Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L.
REv. 847, 855-57 (1996).
2. See, e.g., James W. Meeker & John Dombrink, Access to the Civil Courts for Those of Low and
Moderate Means, 66 S. CAL. L. LEV. 2217, 2227 (1993) (suggesting that increased reliance on
ADR might be one means of expanding access to justice); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83
GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669-70 (1995) (arguing that settlement, including by means of ADR, pro-
motes such values as "consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and
emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access, and yes, even jus-
tice").
3. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1077-78 (1984) (arguing
that settlement- including in the context of ADR-serves to reinforce "distributional ine-
qualities"); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification
in the Movement To Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 1 (1993) (noting
that ADR is "an often coercive mechanism of pacification").
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pand the enforceability of binding, pre-dispute arbitration clauses.4 As a result,
such arbitration is now used widely, including in consumer and employment
disputes - a practice that makes the United States an outlier among democratic,
economically developed nations.' Advocates of these developments suggest that
they increase access to justice (by lowering procedural costs) and reflect a
commitment to party autonomy (as embodied in contract).6 Opponents argue,
by contrast, that consumers and employees forced into binding, mandatory ar-
bitration are denied the procedural tools required for meaningful vindication of
their rights. Moreover, they assert, such arbitration is the product of contracts
of adhesion and therefore reflects (and reinforces) these disputants' relative
lack of power, rather than their autonomy.7
In this context, a number of legal scholars - including especially those criti-
cal of the Court's recent arbitration jurisprudence -have turned to the past in
an effort to mine history for potential ammunition. Towards this end, many
have emphasized that the immediate roots of the FAA lay in a massive lobbying
campaign to promote arbitration initiated by the New York Chamber of Com-
merce. This campaign led first to the enactment of a New York arbitration
statute in 1920 and thereafter to the passage of the FAA, conceived as a federal
variant of its state predecessor.8 Pointing to these origins, as well as to the fact
4. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78,112-18 (2011).
S. For a discussion of how and why much of the world (other than the United States) rejects
the use of arbitration in consumer and employment disputes, see, for example, JEAN-Louis
DELVOLVE, GERALD H. POINTON & JEAN RoucHE, FRENCH ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE:
A DYNAMIC CIVIL LAW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 48 (2d ed. 2009); Chris-
topher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the
United States, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002); Genevieve Saumier, ConsumerAr-
bitration in the Evolving Canadian Landscape, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1203 (2009); Amy J.
Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 1O LoY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 81
(2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Manda-
tory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 831 (2002).
6. See generally Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 549 (2008);
David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Em-
ployment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink
in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999).
7. See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 33; Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
8. See generally IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS
IN AMERICA 166-79 (2013). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community
and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 979-87 (1999); Claire
Lemercier, Un moddlefranfais des jugement des pairs: les tribunaux de commerce, 179o-188o [A
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that businessmen in this period were increasingly organizing into trade asso-
ciations (each with its own rules for resolving intra-communal disputes), these
scholars have suggested that the core purpose of the statute was to promote
merchant self-regulation. For example, according to Katherine Stone, the FAA
can be understood as following from a broader commitment to associational-
ism-a kind of proto-corporatism, backed by Herbert Hoover in his capacity as
Secretary of Commerce, which would soon find full expression in many of the
policies of the New Deal. 9 From this perspective, the effort of the U.S. Su-
preme Court to expand the reach of the FAA well beyond commercial arbitra-
tion marks a clear departure from the drafters' goal of promoting a form of
communal, intra-merchant dispute resolution.
More recently, Hiro Aragaki has authored an important article that departs
from the usual focus on the New York Chamber of Commerce as the driving
force behind the FAA's enactment. ° In his telling, the FAA emerged from the
efforts of diverse interest groups, including not only businessmen eager to fa-
cilitate a form of private ordering, but also Progressive legal elites, like Roscoe
Pound and William Howard Taft, who were committed to promoting proce-
dural reform." More particularly, the FAA's effort to minimize procedural
complexity- to facilitate "access to an alternative forum" characterized by "sim-
plicity, flexibility, and intolerance of technicalities" -indicates that it "embod-
ied the basic procedural reform values shared by Pound and his colleagues." 2
Along similar lines, Imre Szalai has argued for the importance of "looking at
the arbitration reform movement through the lens of the progressive era."'"
Doing so, he claims, reveals that the FAA was "a significant, early triumph at
the national level in a broader movement for procedural reform."' From this
perspective, the fact that the Supreme Court's expansive arbitration jurispru-
dence gives short shrift to core procedural values suggests that it runs counter
to the intended purposes of the FAA.
These scholars' recognition that the FAA's enactment was part and parcel
of a broader program of Progressive procedural reform is a vital contribution to
the scholarly literature. But the background portrait of such reform on which
French Model ofJudgment by Peers: The Commercial Courts, 179o-188o], at 302-49 (2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author).
9. Stone, supra note 8, at 987-91.
1o. Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939
(2014).
ii. Id. at 1943-53, 1962-90.
12. Id. at 1943.
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both Aragaki and Szalai draw -one common to the literature on civil proce-
dure- glosses over much of the complexity of Progressive procedural commit-
ments. Such scholarship treats the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -the cen-
terpiece of modern-day civil procedure - as the crowning, though delayed,
achievement of Progressive reform efforts,"5 enshrining (in the famous lan-
guage of Rule i) the Progressive commitment to "the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action." 6 The end result is a largely celebratory
teleology, leading from a Progressive commitment to access to justice to the
eventual enactment of the Federal Rules.
But the Progressive campaign to remake procedure was not limited to the
federal courts. If we look at the local level, where, as Michael Willrich notes,
"historians of twentieth-century American law and the state too rarely travel,"
it is the effort to create new, centralized systems of municipal courts that as-
sumes center stage as the core focus of Progressive procedural reform. 7 Indeed,
unlike the campaign to enact the Federal Rules, which bore no fruit until 1938,
the Progressive effort to develop centralized municipal courts achieved imme-
diate results, leading, in Willrich's words, to "a sweeping reorganization of ju-
dicial institutions in the early twentieth century. ,,8 Moreover, one of the lead-
ing such courts - that of Chicago - enabled (in the criminal context) "the rise of
eugenics and other coercive forms of social governance."' 9 This should give
pause to those who would depict Progressive procedural reform as exclusively
other-serving and benign. As Willrich concludes, Progressivism cannot be easi-
ly framed as "a project of either 'social justice' or 'social control,"' but was in-
stead at once both one and the other.'
If we are to understand how the Progressive lawyers responsible for the en-
actment of the FAA conceived of arbitration (and its relationship to broader re-
form goals), we must substantially broaden our conception of what "procedur-
al reform" entailed, looking well beyond the Federal Rules on which civil
procedure scholars tend to fixate. Nor is it sufficient to focus on the statutory
15. See, e.g., PAUL D. MORENO, THE AMERICAN STATE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE NEW DEAL:
THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE TRIUMPH OF PROGRESSIVISM 320-21 (2013);
Aragaki, supra note lo, at 1943, 1963, 1973-2o08; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
909, 943-73 (1987).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
17. Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of
American Law, 19oo-193o, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 67 (1998).
18. Id.
19. MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO
XXVii (2003).
2o. Id. at xxxix.
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language of the FAA and its immediate legislative history. As has long been
recognized, the statutory text is too terse and "indeterminate," and the con-
gressional record "too sparse," to provide real interpretive guidance." To make
meaningful sense of the FAA and of the Progressive conception of arbitration
more generally, it is necessary to examine Progressive lawyers' efforts to devel-
op concrete institutional structures responsible for deploying the procedure-
an area of inquiry neglected by scholars to date.
There were two primary institutional contexts in which Progressives
sought to use arbitration: the new municipal courts and the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), established in 1926. As deployed within the municipal
courts, arbitration was imposed at the discretion of the judge, rather than, as
contemplated in the FAA, through prior agreement of the disputants them-
selves. In this sense, it is the AAA-created specifically for the purpose of facili-
tating the new system of arbitration envisioned by the FAA-that is the most
direct institutional reflection of the statute's intended implementation. None-
theless, some exploration of the Progressives' approach to arbitration within
the municipal courts is critical to any effort to understand how Progressive
lawyers viewed arbitration and its connection to their broader procedural re-
form commitments. This is in part because the municipal courts were so cen-
tral to the Progressive project of procedural reform more generally. In addition,
it seems likely that experience with arbitration within the municipal courts,
though limited, played a role in shaping attitudes towards arbitration in the
(later emerging) AAA.
Although there are differences in how arbitration was conceived as between
the municipal courts and the AAA- and even in how it was conceived over time
within the AAA itself- there are, nonetheless, striking continuities. Most im-
portantly, legal elites consistently embraced arbitration as a means of expand-
ing access to justice (and thereby promoting national unity and values), while
also empowering themselves to exercise significant paternalistic discretion.'
Progressive lawyers' vision of arbitration thus combined a genuine commit-
ment to broadening access to justice with reflexive and deep-rooted paternal-
istic assumptions about the inherent wisdom and authority of legal elites like
themselves. Present-day debates over whether arbitration makes justice more
readily available or instead reinforces elite power can therefore be understood
as reflecting the twin sides of an earlier Progressive-era conception of arbitra-
21. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (describing the "legisla-
tive record" concerning key portions of the FAA as "sparse"); Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's
Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (2011); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading
Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 3o6, 515 (2001).
22. See infra Part II.B, Parts III.B-C.
2946
124:2940 2015
ARBITRATION AND PROGRESSIVE PROCEDURAL REFORM
tion. This is not to claim that but for the Progressive-era developments traced
below, arbitration today would not be subject to these dueling characteriza-
tions. To the contrary, arbitration has a very long history, both in the United
States and elsewhere; and there is good reason to believe that in many contexts
arbitration's appeal has been precisely that it promises a utopian inclusivity de-
nied by formal legal process, even while affording community elites a mecha-
nism for promoting their own interests (and thus the status quo).23 But mod-
ern arbitration under the FAA is most immediately a legacy of the Progressive
era and its movement for procedural reform. Accordingly, the deeply paternal-
istic tendencies of this movement-though too often ignored by procedure
scholars -ought to serve as a cautionary reminder to those who might other-
wise ignore arbitration's downsides.
Part I explores the vital contribution made by Progressive lawyers to the
enactment and subsequent implementation of the FAA. It examines the com-
plex combination of ideological commitments, on the one hand, and profes-
sional and status anxieties, on the other, that led many elite (and would-be
elite) early twentieth-century lawyers to pursue procedural reform. In so do-
ing, it considers why these lawyers were drawn to both arbitration and concili-
ation (now mediation) and why-though it seems strange to us today-they
tended to view these procedures as roughly parallel forms. In their view, both
forms of dispute resolution promised release from the constraints of excessive
legality, affording a means to address the complex problems of modern indus-
trial society, but in ways that (unlike newly emerging social science and admin-
istrative law) preserved for lawyers the possibility of exercising significant pa-
ternalistic discretion.
Part II examines the "small claims and conciliation" branches that Progres-
sives developed within many municipal courts as their leading approach to the
problem of urban civil justice. Given the centrality of small claims and concilia-
tion courts to the Progressive vision of procedural reform and the tendency
among Progressives to equate conciliation with arbitration, these institutions
provide an important window into how Progressives viewed arbitration and its
relationship to broader procedural reform goals. This Part describes how the
idea for such courts drew on the European model of the "conciliation court" -
an institution whose virtues and vices were extensively debated by nineteenth-
century Americans. Ironically, while earlier generations had ultimately decided
against transplanting conciliation courts on the grounds that they promoted an
un-American tendency towards corporatist hierarchy, Progressive lawyers
23. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 3-17 (1983); AMALIA D. KESSLER, A REVO-
LUTION IN COMMERCE: THE PARISIAN MERCHANT COURT AND THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SO-
CIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 70-80, 103-40 (2007).
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sought to use a later variant of this same institution to "Americanize" the ur-
ban, immigrant poor-an endeavor that combined the quintessentially Pro-
gressive commitments to assisting the underserved and exerting social control.
Part III turns to the AAA- the institution in which arbitration took most
meaningful root. Towards this end, it explores the life and thought of Frances
Kellor, a lawyer and sociologist who was a co-founder of the AAA and who
served as its primary administrator from its establishment through her death in
1952. Remembered today primarily as a leader of the Progressive Americaniza-
tion movement, Kellor's importance in shaping an emerging system of arbitra-
tion under the FAA has been largely overlooked. But Kellor played a decisive
role in reimagining arbitration as it came to be practiced within the AAA,
thereby helping to give concrete, institutional content to the sparse formula-
tions of the federal statute. As she reworked it, arbitration ceased to be a means
of assisting the poor, even while it continued to serve other key goals of a pa-
ternalistic program of Progressive procedural reform- including, most im-
portantly, the twin aims of Americanization and lawyer-empowerment. Her
efforts, moreover, provide important insights into how American lawyers who
long prided themselves on their devotion to public adversarial procedure came
to embrace private arbitral proceedings.
The Conclusion inquires into the legacy of Progressives' paternalistic con-
ception of arbitration as embodied in the municipal courts and, most im-
portantly, in Kellor's AAA. An appreciation of this history highlights the extent
to which the legitimacy of arbitration (and mediation) today continues to de-
pend, to a significant degree, on the legitimacy of the third-party arbitrator's
(or mediator's) discretionary exercise of authority. For Progressive lawyers
who imagined themselves as a kind of natural elite, justifying the paternalism
implicit in such exercises of authority posed little difficulty. But the legal pro-
fession, like all of American society, has since been substantially democratized,
making such justification much harder today than it was a century ago. Courts
may therefore have a greater role to play in supplying the requisite assurances
that private arbitration (and mediation) promote public justice.
I. PROGRESSIVE-ERA LAWYERS' PURSUIT OF PROCEDURAL
REFORM
The key role of Progressive lawyers in the enactment and implementation
of the FAA suggests that, as Hiro Aragaki and Imre Szalai argue, the statute
ought to be viewed as an extension of a broader Progressive commitment to
procedural reform.' Making sense of this commitment requires us to examine
24. See generally SzALAi, supra note 8; Aragaki, supra note io.
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the broad range of challenges and opportunities faced by early twentieth-
century lawyers.
A. The Enactment of the FAA
But for the support of Progressive lawyers and bar associations, it is highly
unlikely that either the New York arbitration statute of 1920 or the FAA mod-
eled on it would have been enacted. Both statutes were the product of a mas-
sive educational and lobbying campaign that was initiated by Charles L. Bern-
heimer, head of the New York Chamber of Commerce's Committee on
Arbitration, established (on his urging) in 1911.2' While Bernheimer and the
Chamber were responsible for launching the campaign, it was conducted large-
ly by Progressive lawyer Julius Henry Cohen and the bar associations whose
support he helped garner.26 Cohen brought together Bernheimer and the
Chamber's Committee on Arbitration with the New York Bar Association's
Committee on the Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation to develop a set of
rules and policies for preventing unnecessary litigation -including promoting
arbitration.27 The two organizations successfully lobbied together for the New
York arbitration statute. Thereafter, with the assistance of Cohen, who was
active in the American Bar Association (ABA), Bernheimer and the Chamber
worked with the ABA to press for the enactment of the FAA.2 9 In short, as ar-
gued in a 1926 publication for which Bernheimer wrote the foreword, the New
York Chamber's success in promoting statutory reform was a product, in no
small part, of its efforts to "establish[] the most cordial relations with the local
bar, and the state and American bar associations."3 These efforts were reflect-
ed in the fact that "[e]very proposed change in statute or court rule or in trea-
tises has had the previous approval of the proper bar associations or of the
American Bar Association," such that "the legislative measures were invariably
drafted by the bar with the collaboration of the Chamber's committee."3'
How did Progressive lawyers understand the purposes of the FAA? Work-
ing as counsel for the Chamber, Cohen spoke on its behalf, helping to translate
z5. See SZALAI, supra note 8, at 34-39, 42-45.
26. See id. at 41-42.
27. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THEY BUILDED BETrER THAN THEY KNEW 155 (1946); SZALAI, su-
pra note 8, at 62-63.
28. SzALAI, supra note 8, at 66-70, 73-74, 83-85.
2g. See JULIUs HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 10-11 (1918); SZALAI,
supra note 8, at 103-05, 118-26, 135-44, 158-59.
30. CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHIcS 107-o8 (1926).
31. Id. at io8.
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the businessmen's goals into the language of the law. As we will see, however,
there is good reason to conclude that Cohen's decision to assist the Chamber in
its campaign for arbitration stemmed at least as much from his own ideological
commitment to promoting Progressive procedural reform as it did from any
narrowly professional incentive to satisfy the client.32 Moreover, lawyers' in-
volvement in promoting the FAA extended far beyond formal legal representa-
tion and included the independent efforts of prominent bar associations to
promote the statute's enactment.33 Lawyers thus had their own reasons for pur-
suing the enactment of the FAA, and there is little basis to conclude that these
were the same as those of the elite businessmen of the Chamber. Indeed, the
development of vying arbitration organizations- one led by such businessmen
and the other by lawyers - strongly suggests that the two groups did not, in
fact, share the same understanding of the statute's purposes.
34
In 1922, just two years after the enactment of the New York arbitration
statute, the Arbitration Society of America was established by Moses Gross-
man, a prominent New York City lawyer, in conjunction with other leaders of
the New York and national bars.3" Grossman had approached Bernheimer a
few months earlier to suggest that the two work together in developing the So-
ciety, but Bernheimer had virulently refused any such involvement. 6 As Imre
Szalai explains, "Bernheimer was deeply concerned that Grossman's plan...
would undermine the Chamber's work and the growth of flexible, less formal,
private arbitration tribunals for business interests. ' 37 Bernheimer's fears were,
as it turns out, justified. As developed by Grossman, the Arbitration Society of
America brought together not only businessmen, but also judges and lawyers,
with an eye towards resolving not only commercial disputes, but "all disputes
and differences.", 8 Bernheimer and his businessmen colleagues responded to
the threat posed by Grossman's Association by creating their own competing
organization in 1925: the Arbitration Foundation.39
Concerned that the internecine war between them would undermine the
cause of arbitration, the two groups eventually agreed to resolve their dispute
32. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text; infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
35. AUERBACH, supra note 23, at 1o6; FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY,
FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 11-15 (1948).
36. SZALAI, supra note 8, at 112-14, 117.
37. Id. at 114.
38. Id. at 117 (quoting New Tribunal Cuts Red Tape of Courts in Civil Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 1922, at 1).
39. AUERBACH, supra note 23, at 1O8; KELLOR, supra note 35, at 15.
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by arbitration, leading to their merger and the ensuing birth in 1926 of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA). 4' But as detailed by Jerold Auerbach,
the resulting Association was "an indisputable victory for bench and bar."41 In-
deed, the AAA's first Board of Directors included such Progressive legal lumi-
naries as Roscoe Pound and Charles Evan Hughes.' Lawyers, moreover, dom-
inated the new organization both as board members and as arbitrators, and
they began regularly to serve as counsel in arbitration proceedings. 4 If we wish
to understand the intended purposes of the FAA, it is therefore essential to ex-
amine the aspirations of the lawyers whose support was crucial for its enact-
ment and who spearheaded its initial implementation through the founding of
what would become the AAA.
B. New Challenges to Lawyers'Longstanding Leadership Role
Progressive-era lawyers fundamentally remade the American legal system,
creating the underpinnings of the modern administrative state and refashion-
ing urban justice on the foundations of civil-service bureaucracy and social-
scientific expertise.' The breadth of these lawyers' interests and activities
means that any effort to provide a summary account of their motivations neces-
sarily risks oversimplification. Some generalization is nonetheless possible.
Progressive lawyers recognized that the rise of modern, mass society implied
the need for new procedural mechanisms, beyond the traditional adversarial
trial, to provide ordinary individuals with compensation for harm. Reform was
necessary, they believed, to ensure meaningful access to justice- an important
value in its own right, but one that also served as a key underpinning of social
and political stability and thus national strength. But while advocating for re-
form, Progressive lawyers also understood that, for a variety of reasons -
including the emergence of growing competition from both within and with-
out the legal profession -the effort to develop new procedures had the poten-
tial to undermine their own longstanding status and power within American
society. For Progressives, the embrace of arbitration and conciliation (which
they tended to equate) provided a way to square the circle -to advocate new
modes of access to justice (and thereby strengthen the nation), while at the
same time empowering themselves.
40. AUERBACH, supra note 23, at 1o8; KELLOR, supra note 35, at 16-17.
41. AUERBACH, supra note 23, at 1o8.
42. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 184.
43. AUERBACH, supra note 23, at 1o8; KELLOR, supra note 35, at 18-19.
44. See, e.g., JAMEs WiLLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 98-113
(1950); WILLIUCH, supra note 17, at 29-115.
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In the early decades of the twentieth century, lawyers feared that they were
on the verge of losing their distinctive power and prominence in American so-
ciety. Along with the rise of the modern, administrative state and university,
there emerged government bureaucrats, social workers, and other new profes-
sionals, whom lawyers worried might be better positioned to address a broad
range of social needs.4" The extent of this fear, as well as its role in influencing
lawyers to support the New York Chamber's campaign for arbitration (culmi-
nating in the FAA), is suggested by a book published by Julius Henry Cohen in
1916- at the same time that he was serving as Bernheimer's main ally in press-
ing for the New York arbitration statute. Entitled The Law-Business or Profes-
sion?, Cohen's book argued that lawyers were facing new kinds of competition
in the practice of law and that this, in turn, necessitated a new focus on profes-
sional ethics. In his words, "[a]ll over the country laymen are asking them-
selves: Why are we not permitted to do things lawyers do . ?,,,6 Ensuring
sound legal ethics, Cohen suggested, was a way to preserve the lawyers' guild
monopoly by demonstrating to an increasingly skeptical public that lawyers
viewed law as a public service, rather than a mere trade, and were therefore
ideally suited to perform legal functions. In line with this call for lawyers to
commit themselves to public service, Cohen himself championed a broad range
of causes, seeking to promote rent control and public housing, while also
working to establish the Legal Aid Society.47 So too, he sought to prove his
public-minded devotion to the law by displaying a commitment to procedural
reform and by campaigning, in particular, for the enactment of arbitration
statutes.48 In all these respects, Cohen was in good company.
49
In urging the utility of arbitration and conciliation -as deployed especially
by the municipal courts that served the urban immigrant poor- many Progres-
sive-era lawyers alluded to the risk of losing their professional monopoly. For
example, in 1923, Chief Justice Dempsey of the Municipal Court of Cleveland
45. See generally WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZA-
TIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-1930 (1977); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN ELITE TO PROFES-
SIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988). See
also HURST, supra note 44, at 313-22; Michael Grossberg, The Politics of Professionalism: The
Creation of Legal Aid and the Strains of Political Liberalism in America, 1900-1930, in LAWYERS
AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE
EIGHTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES 305, 307 (Terrence C. Halliday & Lucien Kar-
pik eds., 1997).
46. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW - BUSINESS OR PROFESSION?, at xiv-xv (1916).
47. SZALAI, supra note 8, at 42; Aragaki, supra note lo, at 52.
48. SZALAI, supra note 8, at 45-48, 51, 58-59, 74-76, 80-85, 1O9, 118-23, 133-43, 191-92; Aragaki,
supra note io, at 1947-49, 1979-88, 2003.
49. See HOBSON, supra note 45, at 221-88; SzAIAi, supra note 8, at 26-27, 34-35, 98-1oo; Aragaki,
supra note lo, at 2002-04; Grossberg, supra note 45, at 3o6-07, 312-13.
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argued in favor of the conciliation proceedings afforded by newly established
municipal courts like his own by noting that "[t]he demand and necessity for
simplification of procedure ... is becoming more insistent and it is up to the
legal profession to see the handwriting on the wall and take initiative.""° Simi-
larly, as late as 1935, a Detroit-based lawyer named A. C. Lappin warned that as
lawyers failed to develop "a proper system of securing justice," "the public be-
gins to tinker with the judicial machinery, applies common sense, and organiz-
es trade committees, administrative boards and commissions with judicial
powers."'" The end result was that "[i]f we, as lawyers, do not bestir ourselves
immediately and lead the movement, the movement will lead us -lead us out
of business."52 Pointing in part to the efforts of the AAA, Lappin then argued
that arbitration would enable the lawyer to contribute "to improvement and
progress in turning the wheels of justice" and thereby both "satisfy his client
and make the most of his career." 3
In the eyes of Progressive-era lawyers, the threat to their monopoly came
not only from outside the legal profession, but also from within it. In the wake
of rapid industrialization and extensive immigration, American cities grew
enormously from the late nineteenth century onward. In this new urban envi-
ronment, a new kind of lawyer had emerged. Like the clients they served, these
new lawyers were themselves immigrants. Hailing from Southern and Eastern
Europe, they seemed alien to the more established, Protestant, and often Re-
publican lawyers, not only in the foreign languages that they spoke, but also in
their adherence to Catholicism and Judaism and in their typically Democratic
politics.5 4 So too, these new lawyers seemed to the older sort to be distastefully
aggressive and tradesmen-like in their pursuit of clients."5 It was in part the
fear of losing out to such "ambulance chasers" that led Progressive lawyers to
insist on the vital importance of purifying legal ethics. s6
At the same time, those who belonged to the new breed of lawyers and
were therefore anxious about being perceived as "ambulance chasers" had par-
ticular reason to highlight their own commitment to professional ethics and
So. Chief Justice Dempsey, Conciliation in the City of Cleveland, 9 A.B.A. J. 749, 750 (1923).
51. A.C. Lappin, Arbitration and the Bar, 21 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 164, 166 (1937).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 169.
54. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERI-
CA 49-50, 102-29 (1977); POWELL, supra note 45, at 141-43.
55. See HOBSON, supra note 45, at 298-303 (describing the "battle against the growing 'commer-
cialization' within the bar"); POWELL, supra note 45, at 11-28 (discussing patrician New York
lawyers' distaste for "ethnic small-firm or solo practitioners").
s6. See HOBSON, supra note 45, at 299, 301-03; POWELL, supra note 45, at 141-43.
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procedural reform as a means of distancing themselves from their unwashed
brethren. It is thus surely no coincidence that so many of the Progressive-era
lawyers who pressed for reform were themselves outsiders, eager to be ab-
sorbed into the mainstream, Protestant elite s Two of the lawyers most in-
volved in promoting the FAA and the resulting system of arbitration, Julius
Cohen and Moses Grossman, were Jewish. And as we will see, women also
played an important role in Progressive legal reform -including, in the case of
arbitration, Frances Kellor. 8
That Progressive-era lawyers were drawn to procedural reform in part be-
cause of their fear of losing (or hope of gaining) power does not mean that
their interests were exclusively material. As Robert W. Gordon observes, any
account of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal profession
that attends only to its material interests ignores the important fact that law-
yers understand themselves as "hav[ing] obligations to a universal scheme of
order, 'the law,'.., that [is] supposed to regulate social life in accordance with
prevailing political conceptions of the good."5 9 Indeed, American lawyers long
viewed themselves as key civic leaders - an inheritance of a nineteenth-century,
civic-republican image of the lawyer as the country's natural elite responsible
for undertaking the public-serving acts required to preserve and promote na-
tional well-being. 6° But many of the same developments that seemed to un-
dermine lawyers' monopoly also served to reconfigure their role, such that
their claim to a position of social and political leadership came to seem increas-
ingly tenuous.
Conceiving of themselves as modern-day Ciceros, antebellum lawyers
regularly sought opportunities to undertake highly visible, public oratory,
5". See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, From Rags to Robes: The Legal Profession, Social Mobility and the
American Jewish Experience, 66 AM. JEWISH HIST. Q 249 (1976) (discussing Jews' rise to
prominence in the legal profession from the early twentieth-century onward); William E.
Forbath, Jews, Law and Identity Politics (Mar. 31, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://
www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/wforbath/papers/forbath-jews law and identity-politics.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8CMB-QPXB] (describing the highly influential role of Jewish lawyers in
shaping Progressive-era law and constitutionalism).
58. See infra Part III.
59. Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York
City Lawyers, 187o-191o, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIviL WAR AMERICA
51, 53 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
6o. See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of
the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE: J.
INTERDISC. LEGAL STUD. 381, 384-92 (2001) (discussing early nineteenth-century views of
"lawyers as America's governing class"); Robert W. Gordon, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lec-
ture at Harvard Law School (Feb. 1985) (on file with author); see also AMALiA D. KESSLER,
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL
CULTURE, 18oo-1877 (forthcoming) (on file with author).
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ranging from courtroom jury argument and cross-examination to stump
speeches and legislative orations. 6 ' Adversarial litigation, which provided nu-
merous opportunities to engage in such public (and, at least seemingly, public-
serving) oratory, was therefore key to antebellum lawyers' self-conception.6
But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, significant socio-
economic and governmental changes altered the nature of legal practice, de-
creasing the centrality of litigation. The post-bellum period witnessed the
emergence of powerful corporate interests, which helped give rise to a new
kind of lawyer -one valued more for his specialized expertise and capacity to
negotiate than for his ability to undertake courtroom litigation. 6' At the same
time, the development of new banking, insurance, and railroad interests led to
an expansion of the regulatory state.6' And much like the corporations they
tried to police, administrative agencies sought lawyers who were, in the words
of J. Willard Hurst, "[miaster[s] of [f]act" and "[a]dministrators of [s]ocial
[r]elations. " 6
As the significance of litigation declined and lawyers assumed a less visible
and dramatic role, their position of social and political leadership - long linked
to adversarialism- seemed to be in jeopardy. Here as well, however, the quest
for procedural reform appeared to offer a solution. By virtue of their unique
expertise in this arena, lawyers pursuing such reform could display their dis-
tinctive commitment to and capacity for public service, thus justifying their
claim to leadership. As A. C. Lappin reminded his fellow lawyers, "I am con-
vinced that the ordinary man looks to the legal profession, more than to any
other factor, for a proper system of securing justice.",
66
But while Progressive-era lawyers had much to gain by advocating for pro-
cedural reform of any sort, they had good reason to encourage the adoption, in
particular, of both arbitration and conciliation. These two modes of procedure,
they believed, would promote the Americanization of the urban immigrant
poor-a goal whose vital importance was underscored by Charles Evans
Hughes in a speech that he gave to the New York Bar Association in 1918:
61. Gordon, supra note 60; Kessler, supra note 60.
62. Kessler, supra.note 6o.
63. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 329-49 (3d ed. 2005) (discuss-
ing late nineteenth-century developments in the economy and in administrative law and
regulation and how these transformed the nature of legal practice); HURST, supra note 44, at
339, 342-52.
64. HURST, supra note 44, at 339, 342.
65. Id.
66. Lappin, supra note 51, at 166.
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We are fond of speaking of Americanization. If our Bar Association
could create a sentiment which would demand that in all our cities the
police courts and minor civil courts should fairly represent the Republic
as the embodiment of the spirit of justice, our problem of Americaniza-
tion would be more than half solved. A petty tyrant in a police court, re-
fusals of a fair hearing in minor civil courts, the impatient disregard of
an immigrant's ignorance of our ways and language, will daily breed
Bolshevists who are beyond the reach of your appeals. Here is work for
lawyers.... The security of the Republic will be found in the treatment
of the poor and the ignorant; in indifference to their misery and help-
lessness lies disaster.6"
Conciliation and arbitration would make it possible to deliver better, more sat-
isfying justice at the local level and thereby help the country to resist the grow-
ing threat of Bolshevism.
C. The Appeal ofArbitration and Conciliation (and Progressive Lawyers'
Tendency To Equate the Two)
In developing procedural tools for providing access to justice to (and there-
by Americanizing) the urban, immigrant poor, Progressive lawyers were drawn
first and foremost to conciliation, as deployed in municipal court branches de-
voted to "small claims and conciliation." But they also experimented with arbi-
tration.
Conciliation -or, in modern parlance, mediation - is aimed at empowering
the parties themselves to achieve a resolution.68 While approaches to concilia-
tion vary widely, the process is generally one in which a private, third-party
mediator encourages the disputants to agree on a mutually acceptable resolu-
67. KATE HOLLADAY CLAGHORN, THE IMMIGRANT'S DAY IN COURT 155 (1923) (quoting N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 24, 1919).
68. Present-day scholars and practitioners of alternative dispute resolution sometimes draw fine
distinctions between mediation and conciliation, but these are so subtle that there appears to
be striking disagreement within the field. Compare JOHN W. COOLEY WITH STEVEN LUBET,
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) (describing conciliation as a process in which "the
neutral's goal is to assist in reducing tensions, clarifying issues, and getting the parties to
communicate" - in contrast to mediation, in which the neutral goes further and actually "as-
sists the disputants in reaching a voluntary settlement"), with Michael B. Shane, The Differ-
ence Between Mediation and Conciliation, DIsP. RESOL. J. 31 (1995) (defining conciliation as a
process in which a neutral "make[s] a non-binding recommendation or finding that often
concerns the factual or the legal issues in dispute, as well as ... [a recommendation concern-
ing] the appropriate resolution of the dispute" -in contrast to mediation, a process in which
the neutral is "not mandated by the parties to make a finding or decision nor to recommend,
jointly, to the parties").
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tion of their dispute. Since the mediator has no formal authority to impose his
own judgment on the disputants, conciliation is said to occur only when the
disputants themselves freely choose to embrace a given resolution.6 ' Advocates
of the procedure thus claim that it enhances values of party autonomy, while at
the same time enabling the preservation of longstanding and productive rela-
tionships.7'
Arbitration, in contrast, is more akin to a traditional adversarial trial. Al-
though the arbitrator, like the mediator, is a third party appointed by means of
private agreement, her role - much like that of a judge - is to reach her own
judgment as to the appropriate outcome and to impose it on the parties. While
arbitral proceedings are expected to be more streamlined than those of an ad-
versarial trial, they-like litigation, but quite unlike conciliation-are usually
structured around the formal presentation of the evidence, often by legal coun-
sel.7' Proponents of arbitration therefore assert that it offers many of the vir-
tues of trial, including a binding, evidence-based judgment, but with fewer
procedural formalities and thus at lower cost. 7'
While conciliation and arbitration are understood today to be clearly dis-
tinct procedures, Progressive lawyers tended to equate the two. Reflecting this
tendency to associate arbitration with conciliation, the New York County Law-
yers Association created a Committee on Arbitration and Conciliation (headed
by none other than Moses Grossman himself). 3 And the municipal court es-
tablished in New York City -commonly described as the "Poor Man's Court"
and highly visible because of the city's national prominence- was governed by
a procedural code authorizing "a system of arbitration and conciliation between
litigants."74 As observed by Edgar J. Lauer, a judge on the court, he and his col-
leagues on the bench had "secured a new method of disposing of the great
mass of disputes and contentions that ordinarily are brought to court" -
namely, "[r]ules providing for conciliation and arbitration."'5
In the view of Progressive lawyers, these two modes of procedure share cer-
tain key features, such that they should be conceived as kindred forms. This
was the position taken, for example, by Reginald Heber Smith, a prominent
69. COOLEY, supra note 68, at 2-3.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. Id. at 2-7.
72. Id. at 2-6.
73. N.Y. County Lawyers Committees, 5 N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N BULL. 369, 370 (1933).
74. Walter E. Warner, New Municipal Court Code and Rules with Annotations, in 30 EAGLE LIBR.,
No. 192, at 2 (1915).
75. Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation and Arbitration in the Municipal Court of the City of New York: A
New Sphere of Usefulness for the Progressive Modern Court, 66 INS. MONITOR 87, 87 (1918).
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Boston-based lawyer who is widely credited with helping to galvanize the
modern legal aid movement.76 In his seminal 1919 publication Justice and the
Poor ' Smith recognized that as a technical matter, conciliation and arbitration
are distinct.7 But while acknowledging the formal distinctions, he insisted that
as a practical matter, there are important parallels between the two, and, in-
deed, between these forms of procedure and that of small claims courts as well.
Most importantly, all of these procedures aim to eliminate unnecessary techni-
calities and thereby obviate any need for expensive lawyers. In Smith's words,
"small claims courts, conciliation, and arbitration have much in common" in
that "[i]n parallel ways they avoid the fundamental difficulty of the expense of
counsel by making the employment of attorneys unnecessary."79 Along similar
lines, Lauer argued in 1918 that conciliation and arbitration share a tendency
towards procedural simplicity, such that they both permit the "expeditious dis-
posal of litigation" by means of an "inexpensive method.",8, So too, Frances
Kellor observed that "[d]uring its evolution through the centuries, arbitra-
tion.., had become identified with bargaining processes of mediation and
conciliation. ,8
In addition to the cost- and time-savings that they purportedly afford, arbi-
tration and conciliation were said to share other similarities thought to be of
use in the broader project of Americanization. According to contemporary law-
yers, arbitration and conciliation, unlike adversarial procedure, are able to re-
store the relationships threatened by the dispute and thus shore up the com-
munal bonds required for national unity and power. As A. C. Lappin claimed,
"[W]here litigation engenders rancor and hostility, the spirit of conciliation
bows naturally from the closer contacts of arbitration. ''s2 Along similar lines,
Lauer observed that "the contested court trial almost invariably leaves one of
76. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care, 52 ME. L. REv. 301,
302 (2000); Grossberg, supra note 45, at 3o8-12.
77. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (Patterson Smith Publ'g Co., 3d ed. 1972)
(1919).
78. As Smith explained, arbitration "stands midway between conciliation and court litigation"
in that "[l]ike the former [and unlike the latter], it is a method that can be used only by con-
sent," but once the arbitral award has been issued, "the enforceability of the decision rests
not on consent as in conciliation, but on the compulsion of legal process." Id. at 68.
79. Id. at 72.
go. Lauer, supra note 75, at 88.
81. KELOR, supra note 35, at 26. As we will see, Kellor argued that this tendency to confuse ar-
bitration with conciliation came to an end only with the establishment of the AAA and its
development of a newly systematized approach to arbitration. See infra notes 254-262 and
accompanying text.
82. Lappin, supra note 51, at 168.
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the parties dissatisfied," such that "[a]lmost without fail the parties to the con-
troversy become and remain enemies." 8, In contrast, "[t]he result of a concilia-
tion or arbitration proceeding is far different" in that "[a] spirit of good will
and friendliness is encouraged in place of a spirit of hostility and enmity."84 As
a consequence of such good will, "a discharged employee may be re-employed
or an interrupted business relationship may be resumed." 8s In this way, disrup-
tions harmful to the economy are avoided, along with any risk that disgruntled
workers might succumb to leftist radicalization.
But while Progressive lawyers frequently insisted that arbitration and con-
ciliation share a similar propensity for promoting reconciliation, they failed to
specify why this was the case. Although conciliation identifies peace-making as
its end goal, arbitration - as these lawyers were well aware - culminates in a de-
cision that the disputants are bound to respect and that may therefore displease
one, if not both of them.
86
The assumption that arbitration and conciliation both promote harmony
likely lay in some combination of the prevalence (and visibility) of commercial
arbitration and, perhaps more importantly, in the institutional structure of the
new municipal courts. As Progressive lawyers recognized, commercial arbitra-
tion was the most longstanding and well-developed type of arbitration. Smith,
for example, observed that "[i]t was frequently employed in an organized way
by New York merchants as early as 1768. ' '87 Deployed by businessmen seeking
an end to business disruptions, arbitration thus came to be widely associated
with peacemaking. Accordingly, as Smith rightly noted, the New York Cham-
ber of Commerce's Committee on Arbitration lauded itself for its efforts to
promote conciliation. 88 In addition, as we will see, the Progressive model of the
municipal court relied on a powerful judge who was expected to exercise signif-
icant paternalistic power and discretion. In the hands of such a judge, the di-
viding line between reconciling the litigants (conciliation) and imposing his
own view of justice (arbitration) might be difficult to discern. Progressive law-
yers expected, in other words, that the poor immigrant disputants served by
the municipal courts would tend, by virtue of their relative lack of education,
wealth, and power, to respect the judge's authority and thus to reconcile as he
83. Lauer, supra note 75, at 88.
84. Id. at 88, 89.
85. Id. at 89.
86. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
87. SMITH, supra note 77, at 68.
88. Id. at 70 (citing N.Y. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM'N ON ARBITRATION, REPORT FOR 1914,
at 3 (1914)).
2959
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
dictated.8" The same assumption of deference on the part of the poor and un-
educated likely informed Smith's observation that "[i]n the legal aid societies
the principle of arbitration in conjunction with conciliation is daily em-
ployed."90
As this suggests, one of the main reasons that Progressive lawyers found
both conciliation and arbitration so appealing (and tended to associate them
with one another) is that these procedures seemed to promise a release from
the constraints of excessive legality. From the perspective of Progressive law-
yers, the great challenge of their age- a period of tremendous socioeconomic
transition in the wake of rapid post-bellum industrialization-was to preserve
the country's commitment to the democratic rule of law even while endowing
government with the flexibility and expertise required to address the new
problems of mass industrial society. 9 As Roscoe Pound and William Howard
Taft famously argued, there were reasons to suspect that the traditions of
common-law-based adversarialism were poorly suited to the new socioeco-
nomic conditions. 92 Cumbersome and expensive, adversarial litigation was able
to identify violations of legal rights, but it could not in any cost-effective way
provide meaningful relief for the numerous social ills, such as work-place inju-
ry and consumer fraud, that predictably plagued large populations in the new
urban, industrial environment. 93
One solution that Progressives embraced was to turn to social science by
channeling certain recurrent types of claims before bodies of specialized ex-
perts. Precisely this approach was adopted in the workers' compensation
schemes established throughout the United States in the early part of the twen-
tieth century.94 Similarly, the Progressive subdivision of the new municipal
courts into specialized units focused, inter alia, on juvenile justice and crime
89. See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text; see also Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against
Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Dis-
tinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 1o THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423, 431-42
(2009) (discussing Bentham's critique of conciliation proceedings as tending towards the
paternalistic assertion of authority).
go. SMITH, supra note 77, at 70.
91. Grossberg, supra note 45, at 306-07.
92. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 395 (19o6); William H. Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28 (1908);
see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 223-28 (2007) (discussing Pound's speech and its influence).
93. See WIT, supra note 92, at 167-69.
94. See id. at 168-70; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORK-
ING MEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 126-51( 2 0 0 4 ).
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was conceived as an effort to remedy particular social problems through the
deployment of social scientific expertise. 9s
But while Progressive lawyers played a decisive role in developing the ap-
paratus of what came to be called "socialized law," these new administrative
schemes of adjudication posed a threat to lawyers' traditional guild monopoly
and, at least as importantly, to their longstanding position of social and politi-
cal authority. To the extent that dispute resolution came to be viewed as hing-
ing on social scientific expertise-a belief reflected in the growing number of
non-legal specialists (including doctors, psychologists, and social workers)
hired by the new municipal courts96 -what role would lawyers themselves
continue to play in the administration of justice? As John Witt shows, one so-
lution- developed by Pound himself, in alliance with Melvin Belli and the
plaintiffs' injury bar-was to settle cases in certain areas of tort law (including,
notably, automobile injury suits) in accordance with what was essentially a pri-
vatized administrative scheme for assigning liability and damages.97 Although
this approach enabled lawyers to continue earning significant profits, it trans-
formed their role into a largely mechanical, discretion-free exercise, involving
the application of pre-established valuations and rules of thumb. Both concilia-
tion and arbitration, in contrast, allowed lawyers to focus on actively promot-
ing substantive justice, rather than mechanistically applying administrative
guidelines. And while administrative approaches appealed to social scientific
expertise as their underlying source of legitimacy, conciliation and arbitration
were understood to be grounded -in ways that Progressives themselves failed
clearly to theorize -on the discretion (and assumed wisdom) of the legal elites
deploying them. Indeed, perhaps nothing more clearly underscores the deep-
rooted paternalism of the Progressives' conception of arbitration than their
tendency to associate it with conciliation- a practice that, as we will see, a pre-
vious generation of Americans had dismissed as suited only to hierarchical, Old
World societies.
II. COURTS OF "SMALL CLAIMS AND CONCILIATION" AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN TO AMERICANIZE THE URBAN,
IMMIGRANT POOR
Although Progressive lawyers emphasized the utility of both arbitration
and conciliation in addressing the problems of the poor and experimented to
some degree with both procedures, it was conciliation-as deployed in the
9s. See WITr, supra note 92, at 198; see also WLLkiCH, supra note 19, at xxxii-xxxiii.
96. WILLRICH, supra note 19, at xxxii-xxxiii.
97. WITT, supra note 92, at 270-75.
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small claims and conciliation branches of the new municipal courts -that end-
ed up becoming the centerpiece of their program for urban civil justice. Given
the centrality of the small claims and conciliation courts to the Progressive vi-
sion of civil justice, as well as Progressives' tendency to depict arbitration and
conciliation as kindred forms, any attempt to make sense of the Progressive
conception of arbitration (and its relation to broader procedural reform goals)
ought to take some account of these courts. Put differently, one way to under-
stand what Progressives hoped might be achieved through arbitration is to ex-
plore their aspirations for the small claims and conciliation courts.
A. The European Model of the Conciliation Court and the (Largely) Failed
Nineteenth-Centuty American Efforts To Transplant It
The Progressive push to develop municipal courts was part of a broader ef-
fort, associated first and foremost with Republicans, to weed out the Demo-
cratic party machines that had long dominated major urban areas. Although
the municipal courts varied in structure and function, they shared a common
focus on providing access to justice for urban dwellers, many of whom were
poor immigrants. From the perspective of Progressive reformers, winning the
hearts and minds of these men and women was a way not only to promote Re-
publican victory at the ballot box, but also to counter dangerous tendencies to-
wards radicalization that were reflected in the prevalence of labor mobilization
and strike activity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 99
Reformers thus devoted particular attention to establishing "small claims and
conciliation" branches within the municipal courts. Expected to specialize in
the minor matters thought to typify the complaints of the urban poor,100 the
small claims and conciliation courts would deploy conciliation whenever possi-
ble as a means of ensuring rapid, cheap, and possibly lawyer-free dispute reso-
lution.'
It is at first glance surprising that Progressive lawyers would encourage the
development of a mode of procedure intended to facilitate the ability to pro-
ceed pro se, in that this would seem to threaten their own professional inter-
ests. In reality, however, elite lawyers were only too happy to undermine the
client base of the "ambulance chasers," who tended to monopolize representa-
98. See HURST, supra note 44, at 98-1oo.
99. See WILLRICH, supra note 19, at xxx-xxxi.
loo. See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
iol. See generally Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 293, 313-46 (describing the evolution of small claims courts).
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tion of the urban poor.' °2 As explained in the annual report of the ABA's
Committee on Small Claims and Conciliation Procedure in 1924, "[T]he better
members of our profession have no ardent desire to try $25 cases in a small
claims court and. . . it is the less desirable fraction of the bar that the small
claims courts want to keep out . .. -,o3 But while elite Progressive lawyers were
perfectly willing to do away with lawyers as counsel to the disputants in such
courts, they assumed that lawyers (of their own ilk) would serve as judges.' °4
In devising courts of small claims and conciliation, Progressive lawyers
drew on the European model of the conciliation court -an ideal type that, as I
have argued elsewhere, was devised by Jeremy Bentham based on the French
bureaux de conciliation.'°s Created by the French revolutionaries in 1790, these
institutions were shortly thereafter adopted by other continental European
countries and their colonies, including Spain, Prussia, and Denmark.1° 6 As de-
picted by Bentham, the defining feature of these courts was that they relied on
lay judges, lacking legal training, who were elected by the local community be-
cause of their reputation for wisdom and common sense. Such judges were ex-
pected to deploy their high standing within the community, rather than legal
knowledge, to mediate intra-communal disputes in private, lawyer-free pro-
ceedings.'
0 7
Bentham ultimately concluded that conciliation courts were fundamentally
paternalistic institutions and therefore ill-suited to any society committed to
principles of democratic governance. '°8 But despite his own concerns, Ben-
tham's ideal type of the "conciliation court" was embraced by others, who be-
gan using the term to refer not only to bureaux de conciliation (and their coun-
terparts outside of France), but also to other types of courts. These included,
most especially, the European labor courts, modeled on the French conseils de
prud'hommes, in which lay representatives of capital and labor, elected by their
respective constituents, sat together to resolve employment disputes.'0 9 While
the various institutions that came within the broader rubric of "conciliation
court" differed in significant respects, they shared certain core characteristics.
1O2. See POWELL, supra note 45, at 141-44; see also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
103. Conference of Delegates Deals with Vital Topics in 1924 Meeting, lo A.B.A. J. 815, 830 (1924).
104. See infra notes 125-56 and accompanying text.
10s. Kessler, supra note 89, at 431-42.
lO6. Id. at 426, 451.
107. See id. at 462.
lO8. The one possible exception that he was willing to countenance was for family-related dis-
putes, since the patriarchal model of the family made paternalism appropriate. Kessler, supra
note 89, at 439-41.
log. Kessler, supra note 60.
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These included, most importantly, a reliance on lay leaders, who were selected
because of their standing within the relevant community, to resolve disputes
on the basis of informal, conciliation-promoting procedures. And as I have ar-
gued elsewhere, these shared characteristics derived from a centuries-old Euro-
pean tradition of corporatism pursuant to which the group, rather than the in-
dividual, was the focal point of the law. "'
In urging the adoption of "courts of small claims and conciliation," Pro-
gressive lawyers frequently pointed to the European model of the conciliation
court. For example, Reginald Heber Smith observed that "[i]n Norway and
Denmark courts of conciliation have existed since 1795" and that "in Norway 75
per cent and in Denmark 90 per cent of all litigation is peaceably adjusted
through judicial conciliation.'"" He further remarked that "[i]n the industrial
[or labor] courts of France, Switzerland, and Germany which have jurisdiction
over disputes between employers and employees, conciliation plays a leading
part.""' 2 Similarly, in a 1917 article concerning courts of small claims and concil-
iation, William R. Vance, then dean of the University of Minnesota Law
School, commented that "[b]y royal edicts of 1795 and 1797 there were estab-
lished in Denmark and Norway... courts of conciliation which have proved so
highly successful in affording inexpensive and speedy justice to the poorer class
of suitors, that their fame has spread throughout the world.""' 3 Moreover, "[i] n
France, at the time of the Revolution, conciliation powers were given to justices
of the peace [heading the bureaux de conciliation], with the result that their
courts have continued for over a hundred years to dispose annually of huge
numbers of small cases by bringing the parties to an amicable understand-
ing.""
4
In seeking to develop courts of small claims and conciliation, inspired by
the European model of the conciliation court, Progressives operated within a
remarkably long tradition of American efforts to transplant this model to the
New World. Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere, Americans engaged in multi-
ple debates throughout the nineteenth century concerning the desirability of
such institutions."' But despite these pervasive debates (several of which re-
sulted in the enactment of state constitutional provisions authorizing legisla-
110. Id.
111. SMITH, supra note 77, at 61-62.
112. Id. at 62.
113. William R. Vance, A Proposed Court of Conciliation, 1 MINN. L. REv. 107, io8 (1917).
114. Id. at io9; see also Dempsey, supra note 5o, at 750 (observing that "Courts of Conciliation are
not peculiarly American institutions" and that they have long existed in Denmark, Norway,
and France).
115. See Kessler, supra note 89, at 442-78; Kessler, supra note 6o.
2964
124:2940 2015
ARBITRATION AND PROGRESSIVE PROCEDURAL REFORM
tures to create conciliation courts), these institutions did not meaningfully take
root in American soil.", 6 While the reasons for these repeated failures are varied
and complex, the most important factor was that Americans concluded that
conciliation courts were grounded on a corporatist tradition largely absent
from the United States. In a country that prided itself on its commitment to
individual equality, it was, in short, far from clear where to ground (and how
to justify) the conciliation judge's extralegal, discretionary authority. Accord-
ingly, nineteenth-century (white) Americans ultimately rejected such courts as
suited only to hierarchical and despotic European nations (and to African-
Americans, imagined to be primitive and deferential)." 7
In arguing for the establishment of courts of small claims and conciliation,
Progressives often acknowledged the largely failed nineteenth-century efforts
to establish such institutions in the United States. Vance, for example, noted
that in 1846, the New York Constitution was revised to include a provision
"authorizing the legislature to establish courts of conciliation," but "[t]he New
York legislature seems never to have seriously considered exercising the power
thus given. , 1, 8 And while "[c]onstitutional provisions similar to that of 1846 in
New York were adopted" in several other states, these resulted at most in the
enactment of statutes "of limited scope and doubtful usefulness."'1 9 Similarly,
Smith remarked that "[i]n the reform wave of 1846 to 1852 . . . provisions re-
specting conciliation were inserted in six of the new constitutions which were
adopted during that period," but in all these jurisdictions, "the plan met
with... failure."'"2 Perhaps because of these failures, most Progressives argu-
ing for the establishment of courts of small claims and conciliation ultimately
did not dwell much on history. 2' Instead, they simply underscored the press-
ing present-day need for such institutions, pointing to the threat to core Amer-
ican values posed by a growing mass of unassimilated urban immigrants. In a
move redolent with (unrecognized) irony, they sought to deploy for purposes
of promoting Americanization an institution rejected by their nineteenth-
century predecessors as fundamentally un-American.
Along these lines, Smith argued in favor of small claims and conciliation
courts by noting that one "accruing advantage of having the parties brought
116. The one partial exception was the Freedmen's Bureau Courts created by the North to facili-
tate the postbellum Reconstruction of the South. See Kessler, supra note 6o; Kessler, supra
note 89, at 470-78.
117. See Kessler, supra note 6o; Kessler, supra note 89, at 464-78.
118. Vance, supra note 113, at lo9.
119. Id.
120. SMITH, supra note 77, at 61.
121. See Vance, supra note 113, at 11o.
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into direct contact with the judge" is that this "mak[es] justice seem a more re-
al thing to the average man" - a development that would, in turn, result in
"beneficial effects on good citizenship and loyalty."'" The ABA's Committee on
Small Claims and Conciliation Procedure made much the same point. The
Committee's 1924 report includes a section entitled "Genuine 'Americaniza-
tion.""'23 As this title suggests, the Committee believed that the utility of courts
of small claims and conciliation was not simply that "they do justice in a class
of cases where justice could not be done by the machinery formerly in exist-
ence." " Of at least equal importance was that these courts demonstrated
American principles of equal justice under the law, thus winning the hearts and
minds of those urban immigrant dwellers at risk of radicalization. In the words
of the report, "[b]ecause they secure justice to the humble citizen with his
small case they demonstrate the integrity of our institutions and they afford a
practical object lesson in real, as distinguished from talky-talk, Americaniza-
tion."1
25
B. The Progressive Prototype: Manuel Levine's Cleveland-Based "Conciliation
Branch"
In insisting that municipal courts would play a vital role in a broader pro-
gram of Americanization, Progressives looked first and foremost to Judge Ma-
nuel Levine of the Cleveland Municipal Court.126 With the support of his judi-
cial colleagues, Levine created a specialized "Conciliation Branch" of the court
in March 1913.27 The contemporary pro-reform press praised Levine, a Repub-
lican, for his successful attempts -first as a police prosecutor and then as a
judge of the Municipal Court -to clean up the corruption that had once typi-
fied Democrat-controlled Cleveland. As depicted in these reports, Levine's ef-
forts to target such corruption and thereby bring law and justice to the city's
poor, immigrant community were best understood as mechanisms of Ameri-
canization.
122. SMITH, supra note 77, at 52-53.
123. Conference of Delegates Deals with Vital Topics in 1924 Meeting, supra note 103, at 830 (provid-
ing the Report of Committee on Small Claims and Conciliation Procedure).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 77, at 63-65; Newton A. Fuessle, The People's Court: Making
Americans by Justice, COLLIER'S, July 3, 1915, at 27; Raymond C. Moley, Justice Through
Common Sense: The Conciliation Court, 33 SURV. 99, 101 (1914); Ernest Poole, The Story of
Manuel Levine, OUTLOOK, Oct. 26, 1907, at 414; Philip R. White, Conciliation Branch of the
Municipal Court of Cleveland, LEGAL AID REv., Oct. 1915, at 1.
127. SMITH, supra note 77, at 63-65; Fuessle, supra note 126, at 27.
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Consider, for example, a piece published in 1907 by Ernest Poole, a journal-
ist and advocate of social reform who would go on to later fame as a novelist.'
According to Poole, the party "boss" who ran Cleveland's sixteenth ward was
widely known by the local immigrant Jewish community, recently arrived from
Russia and elsewhere in eastern Europe, as "the Czar." 29 While the Czar held
election campaign events on a platform decorated with "the Stars and Stripes,"
he conducted himself in all public matters as if he were an Old World des-
pot.13 He "spoke in Yiddish," rather than English, and he encouraged the au-
dience of mostly peddlers to engage in theft and to do their "best to escape the
vigilance of the police department." 3' If they were caught, he promised, he
would help them, aided by the many judges and prosecutors in his pocket:
"'For here are our judges and our prosecutors. They are with us tonight and are
with us all the time." 32 Among the judges in the "boss's" pocket were the jus-
tices of the peace, who earned their fees through numerous corrupt practices
and whose "victims were usually ignorant working men and women who could
not afford lawyers." 33 In short, as depicted by Poole, Cleveland municipal gov-
ernance was not only corrupt but also under the control of foreign elements
who conducted all business and politics in an alien language and culture - one
that threatened core American values of property and justice under the law.
According to Poole, strong Progressive leadership of the sort that Manuel
Levine represented offered the solution to the problems of Cleveland, as well as
those of the nation's other urban areas. Appointed as an assistant police prose-
cutor, Levine eagerly fulfilled the hopes of his backers, using his power to clean
up the city.'34 This meant not only going after the Czar and his cronies, but al-
so persuading the local Jewish immigrants that they could trust the American
legal and political system to protect their interests and thus do without the
Czar's patronage. Towards this end, Levine organized the peddlers in town in-
to "a society for political independence and mutual aid," and speaking with
hundreds of its members at a time, "[h] e assured them that they were not out-
laws, as the Czar had said. He told them that in America Jews need not fear the
128. EDD APPLEGATE, MUCKRAKERS: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF WRITERS AND EDITORS 142-
46 (2008).




133. Id. at 417; see also Fuessle, supra note 126, at 27 ("The victims [of the justices of the peace]
were usually ignorant foreigners, unable to afford lawyers.").
134. Poole, supra note 126, at 415-19.
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police if they complied with the laws." 3' By persuading these peddlers of the
justice of American institutions, he succeeded, moreover, in curbing their ille-
gal activity, such that "since that time it is amazing how the trade in stolen
goods has dropped off.1113
6
Written in 1907, Poole's article preceded Levine's election to the Cleveland
Municipal Court and his subsequent establishment of a Conciliation Branch.
But as depicted in articles thereafter published in Progressive newspapers, Lev-
ine's work as a conciliation judge tracked the pedagogical, Americanizing role
that he had previously assumed as a prosecutor. This was precisely the point
made in 1915 by Newton A. Fuessle, another journalist and novelist, in an arti-
cle aptly entitled The People's Court: Making Americans by Justice.137 According to
Fuessle, "Judge Manuel Levine gave Cleveland its Court of Conciliation, just as
he gave Cleveland last year its first great Fourth of July reception for newly
naturalized citizens - a... forerunner of the year's 'Americanization Day' cele-
brations .. 13 As suggested by this reference to Americanization Day- a cel-
ebration organized in 1915 by Progressive lawyer Frances Kellor and the Na-
tional Americanization Committee that she headed 39 -Levine's conciliation
court was an instrument for promoting Americanization. "[A] forum of com-
mon sense, unfettered by technicalities" and with "judges [who] are peacemak-
ers," the conciliation court decided disputes without lawyers "confus[ing] liti-
gants" and with "[e]ach party tell[ing] his story in his own language." 4 ° The
end result was that "Levine had done for Cleveland's immigrants what no one
else had ever thought of doing. He took away the fear of the law, and stimulat-
ed them to right living and fair dealing.""
135. Id. at 419.
136. Id.
137. Fuessle, supra note 126, at 27.
138. Id.
139. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATnISM 1860-1925, at
242-44 (1969).
140. Fuessle, supra note 126, at 27.
141. Id. That Levine's role as conciliation judge was to teach American values and thereby instill a
love of American law and justice was a point made not only by his Progressive supporters,
but also by Levine himself. As he reflected in an article appearing in the January 1916 issue
of the Immigrants in America Review, a publication edited by Frances Kellor,
When justice is reduced to terms of simplicity, the relation of the litigant to the
court will become more intimate. There will be a better understanding of the
function of courts on the part of the people, and a better appreciation as to the
needs of the people on the part of the judge. The courts will then become an add-
ed bulwark of our liberties as they will instil into the hearts of Americans and
coming Americans a firmer faith in the justice of democracy.
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What enabled Levine to deploy the "Conciliation Branch" of the municipal
court as such an effective method of Americanization? The official Progressive
line was that by simplifying procedure, courts of small claims and conciliation
eliminated the technicalities that prevented the just outcome from emerging as
a self-evident truth. In Smith's words, "after rules of pleadings, procedure, and
evidence have been eliminated, there is nothing left for the lawyer to do."4 2
Progressive lawyers were thus careful to insist that, unlike the European model
of the conciliation court rejected by their nineteenth-century predecessors, the-
se new American courts did not afford what Max Weber termed "kadi jus-
tice" - namely, a form of personalized justice, which hinged on the judge's high
status within the community (and concomitant ability to secure deference to
his judgments). 43 Instead, Progressive lawyers argued, courts of small claims
and conciliation merely enforced generally applicable rules of law in a proce-
durally simplified and therefore more cost-effective manner.
In seeking to distance small claims and conciliation courts from kadi jus-
tice, Progressives frequently referred to Harun al-Rashid-the Abbasid Caliph
of late eighth- and early ninth-century Baghdad who was famously depicted in
the Arabian Nights as a quintessentially just ruler.1 " Consider, for example, the
following passage from the 1924 report of the ABA's Committee on Small
Claims and Conciliation Procedure: "The justice of the case [in courts of small
claims and conciliation] is determined ... not as the arbitrary ruling of an un-
trammeled despot and not as the merciful dispensation of a Haroun-el-
Raschid, but according to law."'4 In much the same way, Smith rejected the
notion that Levine was a "Haroun-al-Rashid, the inference being that he dis-
pense[s] a sort of Oriental justice without regard to rules of law.' ', 46 Although
Levine's court "exercises wide equity powers," it was, Smith claimed,
"[flundamentally... a court of law. '"'47 Underlying this effort to distance small
claims and conciliation courts from kadi justice was an inchoate understanding
among Progressive legal elites that an institution in which the judge's legitima-
Manuel Levine, Getting the Immigrant's Trial Balance in the Cleveland Courts, IMMIGRANTS IN
AM. REv., Jan. 1916, at 31, 36.
142. SMITH, supra note 77, at 72.
143. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 976
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978); Kessler, supra note 6o.
144. See LUDWIG W. ADAMEC, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 120 (2d ed. 2009); Ulrich Mar-
zolph, Harun al-Rashid (786-8o9), in 2 THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOLKTALES &
FAIRY TALES 443-44 (Donald Haase ed., 2008).
145. Conference of Delegates Deals with Vital Topics in 194z Meeting, supra note 103, at 829 (provid-
ing the Report of Committee on Small Claims and Conciliation Procedure).
146. SMITH, supra note 77, at 51.
147. Id.
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cy hinged on his high communal standing, rather than his legal knowledge, did
not necessarily play to their strengths.
But while Progressive lawyers tended to insist that courts of small claims
and conciliation based their decisions on generally applicable law, their coun-
terparts in journalism were not so sure. A close examination of Levine's Cleve-
land-based court, they implied, revealed that it was the judge's position of
leadership within the Jewish immigrant community, rather than his legal
knowledge, that accounted for his success in promoting conciliation and estab-
lishing the court's legitimacy. As Poole was careful to highlight, Levine came
from the same Jewish immigrant community as "the Czar" and his corrupt
compatriots.148 He was "a Russian Jew" who had learned "the meaning of des-
potism" as a young man exposed to "the flogging of women and children by
Cossacks and police." 49 Having heard "in secret meetings" about "the Ameri-
can Constitution... [and] the Declaration of Independence," Levine had man-
aged to "escape[] across the Russian frontier and had come to America, full of
hopes and dreams and ideals of this mighty free Republic."' Horrified to dis-
cover that, just as a czar controlled Russia, so too a czar controlled much of
Cleveland, he became despondent. But then he discovered "Hiram House," one
of the first settlement houses in the country, and "[h]ere, from George Bella-
my, the head worker [and founder] of the House, he began to get other ideas
of American city life."' Infused with these Progressive ideas, Levine began
teaching himself English, "joined a social reform club," and while "work[ing]
sixteen hours a day" somehow managed to earn a law degree through night
school. "52
Having pulled himself up by his own bootstraps -with the assistance of
Progressive reformers -Levine was an object lesson in what Progressive urban
reform could achieve. He and his Progressive backers were thus determined
that he should be the one to persuade his fellow immigrants to turn their loyal-
ty from the (local and foreign) czar to American law and justice. As Poole ex-
plained, "through the help of Bellamy and other friends, [Levine] was appoint-
ed an assistant police prosecutor."'5 3 And in selecting Levine for the position,
the District Attorney remarked: "'I ... [did so] . . . because I knew I could trust
him to show his own people, the immigrants, that, in spite of all they had
learned, there was such a thing as justice in America- equality before the




152. Id. at 413-15.
153. Id. at 415.
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law."" 4 In short, Poole concluded, Levine's success proved that immigrants
themselves had a special role to play in solving the "immigrant problem" then
facing American cities:
There are many men of this stamp beginning to appear in the foreign
quarters of our cities. And the work that they are doing in these days of
immigrant problems gives strong hope that perhaps, after all, so long as
America is a democracy, the real salvation of the immigrants may be
best worked out for them by their own leaders - and by themselves."' 5
Much like Poole, and true to a tradition of thinking about conciliation
courts dating back to Jeremy Bentham, Fuessle emphasized that what enabled
Levine to succeed in his role as an (Americanizing) conciliation judge was the
trust that the local litigants placed in him as a member of their own Jewish,
immigrant community. Like an earlier generation of Americans debating the
merits of conciliation courts, and quite unlike Reginald Heber Smith and the
American Bar Association, Fuessle depicted Levine as exercising a kind of kadi
justice. In Fuessle's words, "Levine is a sort of Harun-al-Raschid in Cleveland"
around whom locals from the community flock, seeking wisdom and advice:
"Women come with babies in their arms, and men with the dirt and sweat of
toil on their faces. He is bringing the court and its functions within the scope




For Progressive lawyers, eager to develop some variant of the conciliation
court as a mechanism for Americanization, but also to insist that these courts
were bound by the rule of law, the conjunction of small claims and conciliation
was the solution to the logical quandary in which they found themselves. As
Smith argued:
In these courts it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine where their
function as a conciliation tribunal ends and their work as a small claims
court begins .. .[but] [f]ortunately, it is not necessary [to do so]. In
the field of small claims the two merge and become indistinguishable
because both are based on precisely the same informal procedure. 1
8
1. Id.
155. Id. at 419.
156. Fuessle, supra note 126, at 27.
157. Id.
158. SMITH, supra note 77, at 63.
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Conjoining small claims and conciliation in this way permitted, in short, a
conceptual fuzziness -one that was justified in the paternalistic mindset of
Progressive legal reformers by the relative disdain in which they held the ur-
ban, immigrant poor whose claims they sought to channel into these new
courts. In the view of such reformers, the law ultimately did not matter much
in these courts, because such inferior people were (1) not likely to have claims
raising any truly difficult question of law or (2) to insist on their legal rights.
As Vance observed:
[M]ost persons, especially of the more ignorant classes, would be will-
ing to accept the advice of a trusted public officer in regard to the set-
tlement of any disputes which they have with their neighbors, and...
comparatively few are of such litigious disposition that they will insist
upon litigating a claim when they have been informed by such an of-
ficer that the claim is without merit.
5 9
Like Bentham before him, Vance and his fellow Progressives understood the
conciliation court model ultimately to hinge on the judge's (communally
grounded) power vis-a-vis the disputants - and on the concomitant willingness
of the disputants to defer to his good counsel. This was, moreover, a key part
of its appeal.
As reflected in the contemporary excitement over courts of "small claims
and conciliation," it was conciliation, rather than arbitration, that the Progres-
sives ultimately embraced as the procedure of choice for delivering urban civil
justice. 6  To the extent that Progressive reformers sought to pursue some
combination of Americanizing urban immigrants and empowering themselves,
it is easy to see why-despite the pervasive tendency to associate conciliation
with arbitration -the former was ultimately deemed better suited to the task.
As we have seen, the inherited European model of the conciliation court sug-
gested that a powerful, discretion-laden judge-one who was in some way
grounded in the community he served-could lead the disputants to correct
(American) living. Moreover, in the process, the lawyer-judge himself would
enjoy substantial, unbridled authority. In contrast, despite the ubiquity of
statements to the effect that arbitration and conciliation were merely variants
on a common theme, the fact was that, as Progressive lawyers were well aware,
arbitration seemed to endow the lawyer serving as decision maker with less
159. Vance, supra note 113, at 111; see also Grossberg, supra note 45, at 307 (arguing that Progres-
sive lawyers favored "a two-tier legal system that sanctioned adversarial solutions for those
who could pay, and alternative forms of dispute resolution for those who could not").
160. See Steele, supra note lOl, at 347-48 (describing the widespread enthusiasm for courts of
small claims and conciliation that persisted through about 1940).
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discretion. As Smith observed, "An arbitrator is not bound to follow the rules
of the substantive law, but the general practice .. is for arbitrators to adhere
rather closely to rules of law."161 Indeed, according to Smith, while small
claims, arbitration, and conciliation procedure were all roughly akin to one an-
other in their focus on procedural simplification, the three modes could be
aligned on a spectrum between formal, law-bound proceedings, on the one
hand, and informal, extralegal proceedings, on the other. In this spectrum,
[A]rbitration stands midway between the other two, with the small
claims court at one end representing ... a legally constituted court of
compulsory jurisdiction and with the conciliation tribunal at the other
end representing . . . an extra-legal agency without any compulsory
power to render or enforce a binding decision.
To the extent that arbitration was to fulfill the procedural reform ambitions of
Progressive lawyers, it would thus have to be developed in ways that attended
to the reality that it was not, in fact, conciliation and that it differed from the
latter primarily in that it tended more closely to approximate formal, adversari-
al procedure.
It was within a very different institutional setting from that of the munici-
pal courts that the Progressive approach to arbitration would develop mean-
ingful roots -namely, within the AAA. In this new context, arbitration lost any
immediate connection to improving the lives of the poor. But it remained very
closely tied to the broader ambition of Progressive legal elites to develop proce-
dures that would promote national unity and values, while also empowering
themselves.
III. THE "AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ARBITRATION" AND THE NEW
IDEAL OF PRIVATE PROCEDURE
The important linkages between the AAA's budding system of arbitration
and the Progressive program of (Americanizing) procedural reform can be seen
in the neglected writings of Frances Kellor -a figure central not only to the
AAA, but also to Progressive legal and social reform more generally. Kellor is
well known to scholars of Progressive-era social reform who study such devel-
opments as the creation of settlement houses and the rise of the Americaniza-
161. Reginald Heber Smith, The Elimination of Delay Through Small Claims Courts and Concilia-
tion Tribunals, 1O PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CiTY N.Y. 216, 217 (1923).
16z. Id.
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tion movement. 6 ' She has been sidelined, however, in the legal literature ad-
dressing the enactment of the FAA and, most especially, the broader project of
Progressive procedural reform. 6 ' This neglect is partially a product of the un-
fortunate tendency to conceive of procedural reform narrowly as top-down
(and federal) rulemaking.'6 s But it is also a legacy of a gendered narrative of
Progressive legal reform-one that has tended to lionize certain heroic, male
icons (usually law professors or judges) as the courageous exponents of legal
change. 66 Yet as Felice Batlan argues, elite and middle-class women working
in settlement houses, serving the needs of the urban, immigrant poor, also
played a vital though unacknowledged role in the development of Progressive
legal thought and reform. 1
6 7
A fixture of the settlement houses, Frances Kellor was one such woman.
Trained as a lawyer and a sociologist, she utilized opportunities afforded by the
program of Progressive reform to develop a career that took her from the set-
tlement houses into the upper echelons of the burgeoning administrative state,
first locally and then nationally. As she recognized, this was a realm of gov-
ernment unique in its willingness to afford a meaningful (though still limited)
role to women.168 At the same time, Kellor developed close relations with busi-
ness elites and sought throughout her years in government to foster various
forms of public-private partnership.16, Having long called for the private sector
to play an important role in addressing the nation's social ills, she ultimately
looked to the arbitration system being developed by the AAA as a means of fur-
thering her abiding commitment to the quintessentially Progressive project of
Americanization.' The end result is an important but forgotten story of Pro-
gressive procedural reform -one that, as we will see, goes a long way towards
163. See, e.g., GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 71-73 (2oo); HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 234-63.
164. Ian Macneil, Hiro Aragaki, and Imre Szalai all make brief mention of Kellor in their discus-
sions of the rise of modern arbitration, but they do not focus substantial attention on her.
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-
INTERNATIONALIZATION 38-40 (1992); Aragaki, supra note lo, at 198 3 -84 , 1993, 20o4; Imre
S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 358-
59, 362 (2007).
165. See Kessler, supra note 60 (critiquing this tendency).
166. Felice Batlan, Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: The Settlement Houses, Sociological Jurispru-
dence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 235, 248-51 (2006).
167. Id.
168. See generally CAMILLA STIVERS, BUREAU MEN, SETTLEMENT WOMEN: CONSTRUCTING PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROGREssIvE ERA (2000).
169. See infra notes 174-179, 184-202, and accompanying text.
170. See infra Parts III.B-C.
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explaining how lawyers came to view the private nature of arbitral proceedings
as a significant value in its own right, consonant with a long tradition of con-
ceiving of American procedure in exceptionalist terms.
A. Kellor's Early Life and Career: Social Gospel, Settlement Houses, and
Americanization
In the years leading up to and through the First World War, Kellor was the
preeminent leader of the Progressive Americanization movement. 7' She thus
remains a controversial figure. While some praise her heroic efforts to help the
disempowered (including especially immigrants), others point to the ways she
sought to impose her own white, middle-class, and Protestant values on the
very people whom she claimed to serve. 172 In reality, both accounts are to some
degree accurate in that they reflect the two sides of the Progressive approach to
reform.
Kellor exemplified the duality of Progressive social and legal reform. Born
in Columbus, Ohio in 1873, she grew up in Coldwater, Michigan, raised by a
single working mother who struggled to make ends meet. 7 In her late teens,
she joined the church of the local Presbyterian Minister, the Reverend Henry P.
Collin, who proved to be enormously influential in shaping her worldviews 4
A devotee of the social gospel movement, Collin urged the application of Chris-
tian ethics to the social ills produced by modern industrial capitalism.7 5 It was
through the social gospel that Kellor, like many other Progressives, was first
inspired to advocate for key reforms in such institutions as factories, prisons,
and schools. In this respect, the Progressive agenda of Kellor and her peers was
a kind of Christianizing mission, pursuant to which the urban immigrant poor
would be exposed to (white and middle-class) Protestant values of "self-help"
171. HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 239.
172. Compare, e.g., Lucille O'Connell, Frances Kellor, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN: THE MOD-
ERN PERIOD 393, 393-95 (Barbara Sicherman et al. eds., 198o) (praising Kellor), and John
Press, Frances Kellor, Americanization, and the Quest for Participatory Democracy (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author) (same), with
TIFFANY M. GILL, BEAUTY SHOP POLITICS: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN'S ACTIvISM IN THE
BEAUTY INDusTRY 34-35 (2010) (criticizing Kellor), and HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 234-59
(same).
173. William Joseph Maxwell, Frances Kellor in the Progressive Era: A Case Study in the Profes-
sionalization of Reform 61-65 (Apr. 22, 1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University) (on file with author).
174. Id. at 75-82; Press, supra note 172, at 23-24.
175. Maxwell, supra note 173, at 75-82; Press, supra note 172, at 23-24.
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and "moral discipline."' 76 As part of the same mission, Progressives sought to
remind community leaders, including prominent business elites, of the im-
portance of "social responsibility," thereby conveying what was in essence a
quasi-secularized message of Christian charity."7
Profoundly shaped by the teachings of the social gospel, Kellor went on to
earn a law degree at Cornell in 1897 and then to pursue graduate training in so-
ciology at the University of Chicago. 17' 8 Thereafter, she went to work in the set-
tlement houses, first in Chicago and then in Manhattan's Lower East Side.
179
The apotheosis of the quintessentially Progressive combination of social service
and paternalism, the settlement houses were designed to provide much needed
assistance to the urban, immigrant poor, while also serving as a laboratory for
the sociological research believed to be key to solving modern social ills. With-
in the settlement houses, white, educated, Protestant women like Kellor pro-
vided services and conducted research. Living alongside the women whom they
served and studied, they modeled the right, American way to behave.18° The
Americanization movement that Kellor would go on to lead had its roots in the
settlement houses, which understood their core mission to be that of Ameri-
canizing the immigrants. This would be achieved by teaching the linguistic,
civic, and job skills necessary for them to become independent citizens and by
providing them, in the interim, the material support required to earn their pat-
riotic loyalty. s
Familiar with Kellor's success in the famous Henry Street settlement house,
then New York Governor Charles Evan Hughes invited her in 1910 to head the
state's new Bureau of Industries and Immigration (BII). 82 In this capacity, she
began what would be a life-long effort- fully in line with the teachings of the
social gospel that she had imbibed in her youth -to harness business leader-
ship in service of social and legal reform. That same year, she assumed control
of the New York-New Jersey branch of the North American Civic League for
176. George M. Marsden, Afterword: Religion, Politics, and the Search for an American Consensus, in
RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 198OS, at 380, 384
(Mark A. Noll ed., 199o). "The social gospel was a program for Christianizing America ....
[Progressive] Republicans were building a Christian consensus, but were suppressing the
exclusivist evangelical Protestant elements so as to be able to absorb the new immigrants
within their domain." Id. at 385.
1i. Id. at 384.
178. Maxwell, supra note 173, at 61-65, 95-100.
179. Id. at 127-29; Press, supra note 172, at 54-55.
18o. See Batlan, supra note 167, at 238-47.
181. See Press, supra note 172, at 55-57.
182. Maxwell, supra note 173, at 183-84; Press, supra note 172, at 69-70.
2976
124:2940 201S
ARBITRATION AND PROGRESSIVE PROCEDURAL REFORM
Immigrants (NACL)'S -a private organization, consisting largely of industri-
alists and financiers, that was originally established in Boston to pursue Ameri-
canization. 84 While the BI and the NACL were distinct organizations, the
lines between them became blurred, as Kellor used her position in each group
to promote the broader goal of encouraging business elites to support social re-
form.'
85
As the United States' entry into the First World War appeared increasingly
likely, the perceived urgency of assimilating the nation's many new immigrants
grew. Haunting many Progressives, including Kellor, was the specter of large-
scale strikes that might threaten a continued supply of essential, wartime labor.
In her words, it was vital
to put English-speaking workmen in... [urban] factories, men able to
understand orders and guard against accident; men able to grasp Amer-
ican industrial ideals, open to American influences and not subject only
to strike agitators or foreign propagandists; to turn indifferent ignorant
residents into understanding voters, participants in the laws under
which they reside; to make immigrant homes American homes and to
carry the American standards of living to the farthest corners of the
community; to unite foreign-born and native alike in enthusiastic loyal-
ty to our national ideals of liberty and justice.'6
In this context, Kellor's Americanization work in the New York area brought
her to national prominence. Assuming direction of the National Americaniza-
tion Committee (NAC), she took a lead in organizing its 1915 effort to trans-
form the July 4 holiday into "Americanization Day.' ', 8, She also continued to
urge an alliance between business and government in promoting Americaniza-
tion. 88 Towards this end, while heading the NAC, she also took a position as
Special Advisor on War Work among Immigrants within the Division of Im-
migrant Education housed within the Federal Bureau of Education.189 Wearing
these two hats, she coordinated the activities of both organizations, ensuring
that key funding for the Division would come directly from the NAC for a full
183. JOHN F. MCCLYMER, WAR AND WELFARE: SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN AMERiCA, 1890-1925, at
11O-11 (198o); Press, supra note 172, at 69-70, 78.
184. MCCLYMER, supra note 183, at 11o-i; Press, supra note 172, at 69-70, 78.
185. Press, supra note 172, at 70. Thus, for example, when the BII lacked sufficient funding from
the legislature to print and distribute its reports, the NACL provided it. Id. at 71.
186. MCCLYMER, supra note 183, at 112-13.
187. HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 243; Maxwell, supra note 173, at 228; Press, supra note 172, at 6.
188. Press, supra note 172, at 185.
189. MCCLYMER, supra note 183, at 114-15.
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five years.' 90 It was only in 1919 when a new federal statute prohibited federal
agencies from taking private funds that this arrangement ceased and, as a re-
sult, the Division collapsed.19 '
Although the end of the war removed one foreign threat, it replaced it with
another in the form of the Red Scare. Kellor thus continued to insist on the vi-
tal importance of business and government leaders committing themselves to a
program of Americanization, this time to resist the danger of Bolshevism. To-
wards this end, in March 1919, Kellor transformed the NAC into a new Inter-
Racial Council, focused on persuading various ethnic leaders within the United
States to join in a campaign for Americanization The Council then pur-
chased the American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers, which
supplied news stories and advertising to the foreign-language press. 9 As Kel-
lor explained to the business elites behind the National Association of Manu-
facturers, the motivation for this purchase was to develop a mechanism for en-
suring that the many foreign-language papers in the country would be "pro-
American." 94 With money supplied in part by the National Association of
Manufacturers, Kellor's Council deployed the American Association of Foreign
Language Newspapers as "'a means of controlling the foreign-language press
and shaping its influence along the lines of a better Americanism and in oppo-
sition to Bolshevism. '-19 s
Despite these achievements, the Inter-Racial Council collapsed by 1921,
along with the Americanization movement as a whole. 9 6 As demilitarization
proceeded and men returned home eager to find work, the need to rely on im-
migrants as a cheap source of labor seemed less pressing.' 97 In this economic
19o. Press, supra note 172, at 210.
191. HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 257; Press, supra note 172, at 210. In her capacity as head of the
NAC and a leading figure within the Division of Immigrant Education, Kellor spearheaded
a range of Americanization initiatives, including such repressive procedures as surveilling all
immigrant aliens and requiring real estate owners to register their tenants with the govern-
ment. MCCLYMER, supra note 183, at 114-15. While not all her proposed measures were
adopted, a number were, leading, inter alia, to the creation of Americanization bureaus
throughout the country. Id. at 115.
192. MCCLYMER, supra note 183, at 121.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Frances Kellor, Address of Miss Frances A. Kellor, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS OF THE UNITED
STATES 361-68 (1919); PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS OF THE UNITED STATES 297 (1920)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 121-22.
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climate, and as a result of a burgeoning belief in supposed racial difference,
business elites and government leaders turned increasingly towards restricting
immigration as the better policy for avoiding Bolshevism and promoting a co-
hesive American polity.18
B. The Great Depression: Kellor's Initial, Corporatist Vision ofArbitration
Within the AAA
It is commonly argued that the end of the Americanization movement
marked a crucial turning point in Kellor's career. In the words of Allison D.
Murdach, "[b]ecause of these defeats [to the movement], Kellor largely aban-
doned her Americanizing efforts after the end of World War I" and shifted in-
stead to a new focus on arbitration. 99 Such assertions, however, misconstrue
the nature of Kellor's interest in arbitration. Arbitration was, in her eyes, a
means of fortifying American values at home and extending them abroad -and
all by relying, as she always had, on the help of business elites. Indeed, it is
striking to note that some of the very same financial magnates who assisted
Kellor in her capacity as leader of the Americanization movement went on to
play a central role in the AAA. For example, the banker Felix Warburg helped
to supply the private funding that she used to support the Americanization
work of the Federal Bureau of Education's Division of Immigrant Education."°
Thereafter, he served on the AAA's first board of directors," seemingly at Kel-
lor's behest. 2 Kellor's embrace of arbitration was thus, in various respects,
very much a continuation of, rather than a departure from, her longstanding
commitment to Americanization.
Intimately involved with Progressive legal and social reform, Kellor was
well aware of efforts to deploy conciliation (and to a lesser extent arbitration)
198. See HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 261-63.
199. Allison D. Murdach, Frances Kellor and the Americanization Movement, 53 SOC. WORK 93, 95
(2008); see also John J. Miller, Miss Americanizer, 83 POL'Y Rsv. 64, 64 (1997) (arguing that
when "in the 1920S, . . .the country decided to slam shut the door" to immigrants, Kellor
"moved on to become an expert in international arbitration"); Sandra K. Partridge, Frances
Kellor and the American Arbitration Association, 2012 Disp. RESOL. J. 16, 18 (describing Kellor's
shift from Americanization to arbitration as a "career change").
200. HIGHAM, supra note 139, at 241-42.
201. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 184.
202. As Kellor noted in a letter that she wrote to Warburg in May 1925, just shortly after the FAA
went into effect- and as the Arbitration Society of America and Arbitration Foundation du-
eled for leadership of the fledgling procedural form -" [i] t will be grand to have you back for
with the increase in the popularity of Miss Arbitration, her suitors tend to quarrel." Letter
from Frances Kellor to Felix Warburg (May 5, 1925) (American Jewish Archive, copy on file
with author).
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as a means of addressing the problems of (and thereby Americanizing) the ur-
ban, immigrant poor.20 3 Indeed, as head of the NACL, she developed a "'con-
ciliation' department" focused on "obtain[ing] settlement of all complaints
brought by aliens."2"4 This department settled on the order of 2,500 complaints
(concerning especially employment and housing) between 1912 and 1913
alone. °" Long experienced with calling on business elites to promote social re-
form-and likely tending (like other Progressives) to associate arbitration with
conciliation- Kellor saw in New York businessmen's burgeoning effort to
promote commercial arbitration an avenue for continuing her long-term com-
mitment to the cause. She therefore became a founding member of the AAA in
1926, serving as its first Vice President from the moment of its birth that year
until her death in 1952. As such, she was widely recognized as "the directing
head" and "chief administrator" of the association, "experienced in every phase
of arbitral problems."" 7 Although Kellor was not the only person to serve in a
leadership position within the AAA, the acknowledged centrality of her role
suggests that her understanding of arbitration constituted a defining strand of
the organization's self-conception, even if there were also others.
Kellor's conception of how to use arbitration within the AAA to promote
national unity and power fluctuated during the first decades of the organiza-
tion's existence in relation to the nature of the challenges that the country
faced. Soon after the AAA was established, the United States sank into the
Great Depression, such that the problem of poverty with which Kellor and oth-
er Progressives had long struggled was further exacerbated. In the election of
Franldin Roosevelt and the development of the New Deal, Kellor saw an op-
portunity to further her long-term commitment to encouraging partnerships
between government and business aimed at assisting the impoverished and
thereby strengthening the nation. Through her leadership position at the AAA,
she sought to guide leading businessmen, as she always had, to fulfill their pat-
riotic obligations towards those less fortunate, while also working closely with
the government administrators responsible for implementing New Deal poli-
203. In her capacity as editor of the Immigrants in America Review - a journal published quarterly
by the Committee for Immigrants in America (itself an auxiliary of, and later absorbed into,
Kellor's National Americanization Committee) - Kellor published a piece authored by Judge
Manuel Levine of the Cleveland Municipal Court describing his efforts to deploy concilia-
tion for purposes of Americanizing the city's immigrant poor. See Levine, supra note 141.
204. Press, supra note 172, at 78.
205. Id. at 79.
ao6. Maxwell, supra note 173, at 264.
207. Philip G. Phillips, Frances Kellor's Arbitration in Action, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (1942)
(book review); see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND CRIME 141 (Nicole Hahn Rafter ed.,
2000) (discussing the centrality of Kellor's role within the AAA).
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cy. °8 Writing in 1934, she presented arbitration- developed by the AAA-as
the cornerstone of the "new industrial society" then in the process of being
built through the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). 9
Held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935, the NIRA was
short-lived." But it embodied in many ways the New Deal aspiration (itself an
outgrowth of Progressive-era politics) for a quasi-corporatist mode of govern-
ance -one that assumed friendly, non-adversarial relations between business
and government. The NIRA thus authorized trade or industrial associations to
develop codes of fair competition and thereby regulate themselves. The hope
was that such codes would help to curb the unrestrained competition believed
to have caused the economic crisis, but in a manner less intrusive than exces-
sive top-down regulation." Responding to these developments, Kellor argued
in a book entitled Arbitration in the New Industrial Society that a way must be
found to "secur[e] compliance with codes on the basis of justice and integri-
ty."2 '2 The answer, she suggested, was arbitration-as supplied first and fore-
most through the AAA.
According to Kellor, the new industrial society hinged on the development
of a new approach to governance -one in which "industry, labor, the govern-
ment and the consumer become partners."' " 3 This vast project of cooperation,
in turn, required "a sufficient amount of economic goodwill to assure the nec-
essary understanding and cooperation which a partnership requires in order to
be successful."2 1 4 While litigation tended to encourage acrimony and thus de-
stroy goodwill, arbitration, Kellor insisted, was the latter's "greatest friend and
protector."21 Accordingly, "[w]herever it goes, arbitration dissipates fear, re-
stores confidence, cultivates goodwill and keeps the industrial machine run-
ning swiftly and smoothly in the way men have dreamed it could be run. ' '2I6 In
so arguing, Kellor drew on the claims of Progressive lawyers from the 191os
and 192os. As we have seen, these lawyers frequently insisted that arbitration,
208. See supra notes 174-179, 184-202 and accompanying text.
20g. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (formerly codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 703-710); FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL SO-
CIETY (1934).
alo. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
211. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. 581, 598-6Ol (2007).
212. KELLOR, supra note 35, at vii.
213. Id. at 3.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 14.
216. Id.
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like conciliation, tended to promote the restoration of friendly relations.' 7
Moreover, just as this earlier generation of lawyers viewed arbitration (and
conciliation) as a means of Americanizing the urban, immigrant worker and
thereby ensuring industrial preparedness, Kellor's vision of how to deploy ar-
bitration within the "new industrial society" focused on promoting the rela-
tions required for industrial efficiency, itself a precondition to the country's ge-
opolitical predominance.
As a practical matter, Kellor's conception of how to use arbitration to pro-
mote national recovery under the NIRA relied on expanding the institutional
framework already created by the AAA. As she explained, the AAA had devel-
oped a "six-point program" that "had for its objective the establishment of ar-
bitration as the quasi-judicial branch of industry for the administration of jus-
tice through trade associations.,,,8 "[U]ndertaken under the direction of the
American Arbitration Association" and involving "the collaboration of approx-
imately three hundred trade associations and professional groups,"1 9 this pro-
gram was to culminate in "[t]he establishment of a central planning agency"
vital for "industrial self-government.' ' 0 Through the development of this pro-
gram, Kellor suggested, the AAA had anticipated the needs of the new indus-
trial society. The codes then being developed under the NIRA, she claimed,
were "not fully coordinated in a workable system; nor [were] they aimed at the
fundamental objective of capturing and controlling the vast amount of eco-
nomic goodwill that [was] running to waste under present methods.""' But a
close study of the AAA's efforts to encourage both inter- and intra-group col-
laborations would provide much needed advice on how to develop a "workable
system." Among the necessary reforms was the establishment of a "Court of
Amity and Arbitration," aimed at resolving commercial, labor, and unfair trade
practice disputes by means of arbitration.' Guidance for how to conduct the
court's proceedings could be supplied by "the forms adopted by the American
Arbitration Association."' So too, the AAA's institutional apparatus would be
of service: "Much of the machinery now in use in New York City under the
auspices of the American Arbitration Association, comprising about fifteen
217. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
218. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 65.
219. Id. at 6S n.2.
22o. Id. at 70, 72.
221. Id. at 198.
222. Id. at 200-02.
223. Id. at 204 n.2.
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hundred arbitrators who serve without compensation, could be placed imme-
diately at the services of the court. " '
The Supreme Court's holding that major portions of the NIRA were un-
constitutional undermined the New Deal vision of industrial codes" s and,
along with it, any opportunity to implement Kellor's plan for AAA-assisted ar-
bitration. Not long thereafter, the global crisis of the 1930s culminated in the
Second World War -itself, as it turned out, a great boon to the country's do-
mestic economy. As the United States emerged from war a political and eco-
nomic superpower, it suddenly seemed that the longstanding problem of pov-
erty was en route to resolution and that the main threat to national security
was the increased power of the Soviet Union, eager to expand its global influ-
ence.
Buoyed by the pervasive optimism of the post-war economic rally -but al-
so well aware of the deepening Soviet threat - Kellor turned once again to arbi-
tration as a mechanism for promoting American values and national power. In
so doing, however, she reimagined its virtues in ways that would have a lasting
influence on how arbitration is justified to this very day. The utility of arbitra-
tion was no longer primarily that it encouraged goodwill and harmony, thereby
facilitating a working partnership between business and government. To the
contrary, arbitration was now conceived as an entirely private affair. Its great
virtue was precisely that, as a form of privately contracted procedure -remote
from government involvement- it taught the quintessentially American virtues
of self-reliance and freedom.
C. The Cold War: Kellor's Later, Free Market Account ofArbitration Within
the AAA
In 1948, just a few years before her death, Kellor published a comprehen-
sive account of the AAA and its vision of the role of arbitration in American
(and global) society.1 6 While the Progressive era was by then long past, Ameri-
can Arbitration: Its History, Functions and Achievements reads in many ways as a
last gasp of the Progressive vision of procedural reform. Its core message thus
links a call for procedural simplicity (the need, in Kellor's words, to substitute
a "simple and attractive" procedure for "legal technicalities")" 7 with a paternal-
istic drive to deploy procedure for purposes of Americanization and lawyer em-
powerment.
224. Id. at 203 n.i.
22S. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
226. KE iOR, supra note 35.
227. Id. at 24.
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According to Kellor, the birth of the AAA inaugurated a new kind of arbi-
tration practice- one that was distinctively American. While she acknowledged
that the early origins of arbitration date back to "the most primitive society" -
to "the dim recesses of fable and mythology" -she argued that the establish-
ment of the AAA constituted a defining new moment in this long history be-
cause it marked the birth of "American Arbitration. ",, The AAA was so
named, in other words, not simply because it was an arbitration association lo-
cated in the United States, but more fundamentally because it was committed
to promoting "American Arbitration." In Kellor's view, the "American concept"
of arbitration was unique in a number of particulars. As embodied in the FAA,
the American approach to arbitration sought to encourage irrevocable, pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate that would result in arbitral awards largely
immune to substantive judicial review.2 9 So too, as facilitated by the AAA, the
American approach afforded pre-constituted arbitral procedures and structures
that transcended any particular dispute and any given professional or trade as-
sociation. 3° But perhaps most importantly, the "American concept of arbitra-
tion was unique" in that it was consonant with distinctively American values. 3 '
As reflected in the AAA's commitment to ensuring that arbitration would
be "responsive to the social and economic needs of American commercial and
industrial life," the American approach to arbitration was "unusual in that it
systematically encouraged individuals in self-regulation and in the control of
their disputes within the framework of free enterprise and business institu-
tions." 32 Indeed, Kellor explained, a core function of arbitration "in a demo-
cratic society is to encourage self-regulation and self-discipline within a frame-
work of individual initiative and private enterprise." 3 Arbitration, in other
words, helped to promote the very ideals of freedom and self-discipline that
she had once taught in the settlement houses. Its purpose was thus not merely
to resolve disputes, but also to serve an educational mission, teaching the (dis-
tinctively American) virtues of a free market order. In this sense, arbitration
228. Id. at 3.
229. See id. at 22-28. In reality, some of the features of arbitration under the FAA and the AAA
that Kellor lauded as uniquely American could be found elsewhere. For example, as Ian
Macneil emphasizes, reforms to English law concerning arbitration -including, most im-
portantly, abrogation of the rule permitting parties to revoke their pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate -proved highly influential for American reformers such as Julius Henry Cohen.
MACNEIL, supra note 164, at 27.
230. See KELLOR, supra note 35, at 22-28.
231. Id. at 27.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 39.
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was "not organized solely in the interest of parties in dispute."234 Accordingly, it
was a mistake to try to finance arbitration exclusively through user fees, since
the result would be "to deter parties from arbitrating" and thereby defeat arbi-
tration's vital pedagogical function. 3 At the same time, it was unthinkable to
seek governmental support, since this ran counter to the core philosophy un-
derlying American arbitration -namely, that it was a quintessentially private
process:
The [American Arbitration] Association believes that voluntary arbitra-
tion ... is the act of private individuals; that it is their self-regulation
and individual effort that should be encouraged, and that, therefore,
systems that encourage or apply voluntary arbitration among contract-
ing parties, should be privately financed.236
As her longstanding commitment to promoting national unity and strength
became tinged by post-war optimism and expansionism, Kellor began to de-
scribe arbitration as an important mechanism for exporting American values
abroad. As she explained, the goal of the AAA was not only "to construct a na-
tional system for economic peace and security in domestic affairs," but also "to
use this system for international peace and security."237 Echoing her earlier em-
phasis on arbitration as a mechanism for promoting goodwill, she suggested
that the AAA would teach individuals across the world how "to arbitrate their
differences within the range of their own activities and experiences" and would
help "governments" to learn how "amicably to solve their differences.,23 8 So
too, the AAA would seek to implement "a long-range program looking toward
the eventual establishment of a universal system" of arbitration. 39 In these
ways, the organization would disseminate arbitral mechanisms designed to
promote world peace while ensuring that this peace was grounded on core
American values of freedom and free enterprise. Because arbitration embodied
ideals of self-governance, the spread of arbitration would be a way of ensuring
that people throughout the world are encouraged to act "of their own accord,
and through their own efforts." 4°
234. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 40-41. Kellor identified charitable "contributions from persons and organizations in-
terested in the public advantages of arbitration" as one key source of income for the AAA. Id.
at 40.
237. Id. at 22.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 148.
24o. Id. at 22.
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In the interim, however, before the ultimate triumph of the American con-
ception of arbitration, there would be competition from elsewhere -most im-
portantly from the Soviets. As Kellor observed, "other countries, like the Soviet
Union," had established "a complete domestic and foreign system of arbitra-
tion," but one that was profoundly un-American in nature. 2 4' In the Soviet Un-
ion, "the reference of disputes is compulsory through state facilities provided
by the government." 42 This defeated the notion that arbitration is an embodi-
ment of freedom, as exemplified in the American system by the fact that parties
choose through free, private contract to submit their dispute to arbitration
(and by the fact that the arbitration is privately financed). As a result, Kellor
concluded, there was reason to be concerned that the use of arbitration for
purposes of "education of the people may not be so feasible" in the Soviet Un-
ion. 43 The American approach to arbitration thus had to be exported abroad to
help counter Soviet influence in the growing Cold War battle for ideological
sway. It was necessary "to make the American concept of arbitration available
to many people in many countries and to carry its message of goodwill and
[privately ordered] co-operation throughout the world. " '
In framing arbitration as a quintessentially American mode of procedure,
Kellor drew on - but also radically reworked - a longstanding discourse pursu-
ant to which a commitment to courtroom-based adversarial procedure is a dis-
tinguishing feature of American identity.4 s Pointing to the asserted intercon-
nection between arbitration and American identity, Kellor suggested that it was
a mystery why a mode of procedure so consonant with American values of free
self-governance played such an "obscure and humble role.., in early American
history." 4 6 In her words, "why [would] a people, so bent upon freedom, self-
discipline, and self-regulation, ... have ignored arbitration, which so embodies
these qualities"? But while both the nineteenth-century discourse of adver-
sarialism and Kellor's defense of arbitration appealed to freedom as a distin-
guishing American value - and suggested, moreover, that the free market was a
key component of such freedom- the move from adversarialism to arbitration
z4i. Id. at 146-47.
242. Id. at 146.
243. Id. at 146.
244. Id. at 16.
245. See Kessler, supra note 6o.
246. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 6.
247. Id. Kellor offered several possible answers to this question. Most importantly, she suggest-
ed, a propensity to tolerate or even applaud disputation was consistent with the country's
initial pioneering mentality: "[D]isputes were regarded as an inevitable and healthful pro-
cess in the development of a new country." Id.
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was accompanied by an important reconceptualization of the procedural impli-
cations of liberty.
As I have argued elsewhere, the language of adversarialism developed in the
nineteenth century suggested that the individual's competitive assertion of self-
interest through adversarial litigation - undertaken in public - was key to sus-
taining American freedom. 48 In contrast, Kellor claimed that it was the private
nature of the arbitral forum - the fact that it was chosen and designed through
free contract - that made it such a bulwark of American liberty. Indeed, as Kel-
lor understood it, the fact that arbitral proceedings were a product of free con-
tract meant that both these proceedings and the awards they generated were a
form of private property. As explained in a Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, issued
in 1946 "as a guide for members of the Panel of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation" (and included as an annex to Kellor's book), the fact that "[t]he parties
appoint the Arbitrator to decide an issue for them and to deliver the award to
them" means that the award is "their joint property and the Arbitrator is not in
a position to release the award to anyone else or to give it publicity without the
approval in writing of all the parties." 9 For like reasons, "[a]n arbitration pro-
ceeding is private and no information or publicity should be given by the Arbi-
trator concerning any matter that transpired during the proceedings, unless
both parties have indicated their willingness to have the matter made pub-
lic."
25 o
But while the "American concept" of arbitration differed from traditional
adversarial procedure in its embrace of privacy, the two shared a significant re-
liance on lawyers. Lawyers not only played a predominant role in building the
AAA, but also regularly "served as arbitrators, or appeared in [arbitral] Tribu-
nals on behalf of clients."25' Indeed, the Commercial Arbitration Rules adopted
by the AAA and annexed to Kellor's book outline a "Procedure for Oral Hear-
ing" that follows in core respects the basic structure of an adversarial trial. 2
Thus, over the years, American lawyers engaged in arbitration have embraced
many of the techniques and attitudes of adversarialism- including cross-
examination, a focus on winning at all costs, and a tendency to treat the judge
as a passive, powerless decision maker. 2 3 Moreover, as we have seen, Progres-
248. See Kessler, supra note 60.
249. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 235 & n.2, 242.
250. Id. at 242.
251. Id. at 18.
252. Id. at 219, 223-25.
253. YvEs DEzALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 51-58 (1996);
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sive lawyers long searched for a mode of procedure that would be more flexible
and cost-effective than traditional, courtroom-based adversarialism, even while
eagerly seeking to preserve for themselves a greater role than that permitted by
new forms of "socialized" and administrative law.254 As developed within the
AAA, arbitration seemed to fit the bill in that it operated outside the constraints
of formal law and procedure but nonetheless enabled lawyers to draw on a
great many of their traditional adversarial techniques.
Indeed, according to Kellor, it was precisely because arbitration, as devel-
oped by the AAA, adhered to core features of adversarial process that it became
possible for the first time clearly to delineate between arbitration and concilia-
tion. As she explained, there was a centuries-old tendency to identify arbitra-
tion with "mediation and conciliation" -one that, as we have seen, was wide-
spread among Progressive-era lawyers."s But the mistaken assumption that
"arbitration was a species of compromise" was, Kellor claimed, "immediately
dispelled under the concept of organized arbitration which the Association put
into effect. '',, 6 This was because, under the AAA's organized system, "[a]ll of
its Panel members were instructed to act as arbitrators and not as mediators or
conciliators, under Rules that made no provision for any proceeding not of a
quasi-judicial character.""5 7 It was "through adherence to this standard that




Able to preserve core aspects of their traditional adversarial role-and even to
continue appealing to the notion that they deployed a distinctively American,
freedom-promoting mode of procedure- lawyers of Kellor's generation (and
those that followed) had good reason to embrace arbitration, even while aban-
doning publicity.
Kellor's writings thus help to explain what would otherwise be an historical
puzzle -namely, how a legal profession that long prided itself on its commit-
ment to adversarial procedure (and that framed this quintessentially public pro-
cedure as a defining feature of an exceptionalist American identity)5 9 was able
to embrace the turn to private arbitral proceedings. In her capacity as a founder
and "chief administrator" of the AAA during the first three decades of its exist-
ence, Kellor acted in the missionary capacity for which Moses Grossman had
Christopher Baum, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Develop-
ment Disputes, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 907, 930-31 (2oo).
254. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.




259. See Kessler, supra note 60.
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called, seeking "to spread the gospel of arbitration. " 6° In this role, she present-
ed arbitration as the natural extension of core American values of freedom and
self-reliance, arguing that it served a vital public function that extended well
beyond the particular interests of any given set of disputants. The implication
was that a great tradition of (lawyer-empowering) American legal exceptional-
ism continued alive and well into the twentieth century, but its foundations
had shifted from public litigation to private arbitration. While this account of
arbitration as a triumphant form of distinctively American procedure has been
forgotten today, it likely played a role in convincing an earlier generation of
lawyers that arbitration was consonant with their inherited conception of pro-
cedure as a device for promoting both public-serving freedom and their own
self-aggrandizement.
Kellor turns out, moreover, to have been quite prescient in suggesting that
there is a uniquely "American concept" of arbitration and that this concept re-
flects a distinctively American commitment to (marketplace) freedom. As
commentators have observed, the United States today is unique in its willing-
ness to extend pre-dispute, binding arbitration to both consumer and employ-
ment disputes. In European countries, arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts are typically deemed unenforceable as a result of both
EU law and national policies 61 While the ability of corporations in the United
States to enforce such clauses is a product of Supreme Court jurisprudence is-
sued well after Kellor's death in 1952, her conception of arbitration as the em-
bodiment of freedom and free contract anticipated (and, indeed, undergirds)
this later body of case law. As Stephen J. Ware recently argued in congressional
proceedings on "Mandatory Binding Arbitration," "What some call 'mandatory
arbitration' is better called 'contractual arbitration' . . . . Arbitration is not
mandatory when it arises out of a contract, because contracts are formed volun-
tarily."1162
As early as the 1930s, Kellor advocated the use of pre-dispute binding arbi-
tration to remake consumer disputes, urging trade associations to include an
arbitration clause within their standard contracts.263 In so arguing, Kellor had
no illusion that the prototypical consumer would actually read the standard
contract in advance of concluding the transaction. She imagined that the con-
26o. Moses H. Grossman, Speeding UpJustice Through Arbitration, 5 ILL. L. Q.135, 138 (1923).
a61. See supra note 5; see also Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC) (including pre-
dispute, binding arbitration clauses on a list of terms presumed to be unfair in consumer
contracts).
262. Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Is It Fair and Voluntary?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 83 (2009) (state-
ment of Stephen J. Ware, Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law).
263. See KELLOR, supra note 209, at 53.
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sumer would discover the arbitration clause only when, having decided to pur-
sue litigation, he consulted a lawyer, who in turn, "examines the contract...
[and] finds that he cannot institute a suit. "264 Such a contract of adhesion was
hardly consonant with Kellor's extravagant praise of arbitration as the embod-
iment of principles of free choice. But it was fully consonant with the paternal-
ism of the Progressive approach to legal and procedural reform. In Kellor's
view, arbitration would serve the consumer's own best interests, as he would in
time come to recognize. The consumer, she stated, would "find[] that at little
cost and in complete privacy the conflicting claims can be immediately consid-
ered and the matter adjusted. 26,
The latent paternalism of Kellor's approach to arbitration is evident per-
haps first and foremost in the AAA's effort to develop what Kellor called "orga-
nized arbitration. ''266 As she repeatedly emphasized, a distinguishing feature of
arbitration under the combined forces of the FAA and AAA was that it afforded
parties a pre-constituted package that they could easily incorporate by reference
into their agreement.267 In this way, parties were spared the burden of having
to design their own unique arbitral procedures -a savings in time and money
that was essential for enabling arbitration to serve as a cost-effective mecha-
nism for addressing the numerous disputes of modern industrial society. This
meant, however, that the legal elites responsible for running the AAA were
themselves entrusted with substantial, discretionary power to craft the pre-
constituted package of procedures as they deemed best. While parties were in
theory free to contract around such pre-packaged procedures, this was not an
option for those subject to contracts of adhesion. Moreover, even when negoti-
ation is possible, default rules are often sticky.268
The weight that Kellor placed on the elite nature of the AAA's leadership
can be seen in the concluding chapter of her book on "American Arbitration."
Entitled "Builders of American Arbitration," the chapter devotes a full thirty-
six pages to listing the various individuals and groups responsible for establish-
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. KELLOR, supra note 35, at 22-28.
267. See id. at 24-25.
268. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 651, 655-61 (2006) (summarizing various scholarly accounts of why parties fail to
opt out of default provisions, even when doing so would seem to be to their advantage);
Russell Korobkin, Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How To Do Law and Economics
Without the Coase Theorem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 300, 323-26 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (describing how the pervasive
psychological tendency to value entitlements more when one is endowed with them than
when one is not translates into a tendency for contractual default provisions to be sticky).
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ing and serving the AAA- including such Progressive legal luminaries as Ros-
coe Pound and Charles Evan Hughes.269 Most tellingly, as suggested by her
tendency to refer interchangeably to the AAA and "American Arbitration," Kel-
lor envisioned the AAA as the only provider of "American Arbitration." 70
While the availability of multiple providers would seem to follow from her
conception of arbitration as the embodiment of a distinctively American com-
mitment to freedom and the (competitive) free market, such a possibility was,
in fact, unimaginable to her. In her view, the AAA reflected the assembled wis-
dom of the Progressive legal elite, such that its monopoly was quite simply be-
yond question.
CONCLUSION
For Progressive lawyers, the appeal of arbitration and conciliation was two-
fold. These practices seemed to afford much needed reform by expanding ac-
cess to justice and thereby strengthening the nation. At the same time, they
preserved a space in which lawyers might continue to exercise significant, un-
constrained discretion of the sort threatened by new, more administrative ap-
proaches to dispute resolution.
From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that the debate over arbitra-
tion today focuses, in no small part, on whether the procedure expands access
to justice or instead serves to empower certain (now largely corporate) elites.
Indeed, despite many scholars' aspirations, efforts to draw on history for evi-
dence that would clearly support one or the other of these positions are bound
to disappoint, because there was no founding moment of consensus from
which we have since departed. The current debate, in other words, simply re-
269. KEULLOR, supra note 35, at 181-217.
270. In Kellor's concluding chapter, "Builders of American Arbitration," she insisted that "Amer-
ican arbitration... has been built in the true American way -by the participation of many
individuals and organizations." Id. at 181. But the five men whom she identified as most re-
sponsible for "the development of American arbitration" were themselves all key leaders of
the AAA. Id. at 181-83. Moreover, the various organizations she listed as participating with
these five in the building of "American arbitration" are themselves all identified as such be-
cause they contributed in some fashion to the work of the AAA. These include components
of the AAA itself (like the Association's board of directors and trade-specific subdivisions) or
affiliated associations (including, inter alia, trade groups and foundations that donated
funds for research). Id. at 184-216. And in insisting on the disinterested, public-serving na-
ture of the efforts undertaken by these "builders" of "American arbitration," Kellor conclud-
ed that "at no time in the history of the Association have the personal interests of these
builders swayed any arbitrator in any tribunal." Id. at 183. As this suggests, the history of
"American arbitration" was all but synonymous, in her mind, with the history of "the
[American Arbitration] Association."
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capitulates the tensions within Progressives' conflicted approach to arbitration.
That does not mean, however, that this history is without implications for the
present.
Both arbitration and mediation (conciliation) today continue to be ground-
ed on the exercise of extralegal discretion. Although many arbitration agree-
ments require the arbitrator to apply a particular body of law, restrictive limits
on judicial review mean that, in practice, arbitrators have significant freedom
to depart from the law in rendering an award.27 And while mediation is said to
depend entirely on the disputants' own decision to reconcile, recent scholarship
has reaffirmed Bentham's now centuries-old insight that, in many cases, it is
quite difficult to distinguish between the disputants' choice and the mediator's
influence. 2 Unlike litigation, ADR's legitimacy thus does not hinge on the au-
thority of the law as such, but instead, as Progressives obliquely recognized, on
the discretionary judgment of the third-party arbitrator or mediator.
Underlying Progressive lawyers' belief that arbitration would expand access
to justice and at the same time reinforce a paternalistic form of social control
was their assumption that they themselves were a natural and necessary elite,
whose empowerment would inevitably redound to the public good. That we
have inherited a Progressive model of arbitration, reflected in the FAA, there-
fore raises the question of where we might locate such an elite today. While
plenty of individuals and groups exercise substantial power, there is no readily
available language by means of which to claim such power as an entitlement. In
the last half-century or so, the legal profession, along with American society as
a whole, has been considerably democratized along any number of dimensions,
including, not least, gender and race.' As a result, the notion that an elite
segment of the bar might call on its own status as a form of collateral-
271. See MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of Manifest
Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REv. 407, 413, 424-30 (2010) (discussing the "manifest
disregard of the law" standard for vacating an arbitral award and noting that (1) it is more
stringent than simply "error or misunderstanding with respect to the law" and (2) there is
currently a split between U.S. circuit courts concerning whether the standard survives the
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008)).
272. See generally Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, loo YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
273. See, e.g., JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTRO-
VERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 130-31 (2011); Carroll
Seron, The Status of Legal Professionalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Chicago Law-
yers and Urban Lawyers, 32 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 581, 596-97 (2007) (reviewing JOHN P.
HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
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designed to ensure that private proceedings will be conducted in furtherance of
the public interest- is much harder to justify or to operationalize, and rightly
so. In a world in which we do not imagine that there is a select legal elite en-
dowed with a self-evident capacity to exercise the right kind of (public-serving)
discretion, justifying the paternalistic authority that arbitrators and mediators
continue to exercise has become much more difficult.
To a great extent, the solution has been to fall back on the market-based
justifications advanced by Kellor. Indeed, in ways that Kellor herself never im-
agined possible, arbitration has become a market product, subject to extensive
competition. Since 1979, the AAA has come to share the field with such com-
petitors as JAMS (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Ser-
vices) and the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution
(CPR), among others.274 In this context, the discretion with which arbitrators
(and mediators) are endowed is legitimated by the disputants' selection of the-
se providers from within a competitive marketplace. But trusting the market in
this way entails the not insubstantial risk that the decision of whom to endow
with discretionary authority will ultimately be determined in accordance with
market power. While current advocates of arbitration follow Kellor's lead in
pointing to the virtues of free contract, it is a mistake to take her entirely at her
word. Like other Progressives, Kellor was all for the free market, but only when
properly managed by the appropriate legal (and public-minded business)
elites. In the absence of a legal and political culture that fosters such leadership
(and deference to it), it may well be necessary for the courts to supply the addi-
tional oversight required to ensure that private arbitration is developed and de-
ployed in the interests of public justice.
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